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I. INTRODUCTION 
Some things in law change frequently and often dramatically.1 For 
some areas, however, change is infrequent, and, when it does occur, its 
pace seems almost glacial. More often than not, the evolution of property 
law falls into the latter category.2 This is good—not bad—because of the 
heavy dependence property places upon certainty and, therefore, the 
consistency achieved by courts and legislatures.  
At the core of property, its ownership, and its concepts, is real estate. 
Indeed, most of property law has been forged and shaped by the law of 
real property. Because land lasts forever and so does its history, the 
marketplace could not function without clarity and stability as to 
ownership. To be sure, stability requires predictability as to use and 
enjoyment, but it also requires predictability as to creation and transfer. 
The latter is, of course, connected to specific language and the consistency 
the law must attach to methods of expression and dispositive commands.3 
The last twenty-five to thirty years have, however, produced relatively 
rapid and even staggering changes in the law of property. Some of these 
 1. For example, beginning approximately forty years ago, residential landlord-tenant law 
changed dramatically over a period of twenty years, and in terms of property history, this was the 
equivalent of an overnight revolution. These changes were accomplished firstly by courts and then 
legislatures, and the most important change concerned the landlord’s implied warranty of habitability. 
For an excellent summary of this body of law, see Roger A. Cunningham, The New Implied and 
Statutory Warranties of Habitability in Residential Leases: From Contract to Status 16 URB. L. ANN. 
3 (1979). 
 2. For example, consider the history of the Fee Tail and its precursor known as the Fee Simple 
Conditional. The latter estate existed until the year 1285. In that year, because of a statute, the Fee 
Simple Conditional was replaced by the Fee Tail, thereby solidifying the rights of both the entail and 
the reversioner. Thereafter, it took over two hundred years for courts to sanction a process involving a 
fictitious law suit that permitted the tenant in tail to extinguish the rights of both the entail and the 
reversioner. Three hundred years later, this process was codified in England, and tenants in tail were 
then permitted by deed to convey a fee simple absolute to another. Finally, it took another century for 
nearly all states within the United States either to adopt legislation patterned after the English model or 
to adopt legislation that abolished the Fee Tail by converting it into other kinds of estates. For a 
summary of the history of the Fee Tail, see CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN & SHELDON F. KURTZ, 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 48–53 (3d ed. 2002). 
 3. Property law is replete with words and phrases used in the creation of interests that have 
consistently received specific meaning. Conveyancers need sign posts by which they can reliably 
create the estates their clients desire, and courts have responded with code language needed to achieve 
such certainty. ‘To B and her heirs’ illustrates such code language. On its face, ‘and heirs’ appears to 
be language of purchase, but over time courts viewed it as language of limitation needed to create a fee 
simple absolute. Today, this language is no longer needed to create a fee simple. Nevertheless, when 
used, courts will consistently give it the same construction as they did hundreds of years ago. See 
MOYNIHAN & KURTZ, supra note 2, at 34–42. One should note, however, that courts sometimes place 
a premium on interpretive consistency even when interpretive certainty is neither necessary nor 
desirable. See David M. Becker, Debunking the Sanctity of Precedent, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 853 (1998). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss3/3
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changes arose out of court decisions that quickly eroded long-standing 
common law principles, while others emerged from statutes immediate 
and full-blown.4 Many of these changes were inspired by groups devoted 
to law review and reform, such as the American Law Institute and the 
Commissioners on Uniform Laws. Some of their changes patched-up; 
some tinkered or fine-tuned, and others revolutionized.5 The latter are not, 
however, always obvious. Among them is § 2-707 of the Uniform Probate 
Code (hereinafter referred to as § 2-707).6  
The authors of § 2-707 make two simple revisions of existing law with 
respect to all trusts. First, § 2-707 requires the beneficiaries of all future 
interests to survive the time for distribution even though the trust does not 
express this condition of survivorship or any other.7 Second, § 2-707 
substitutes in place of a deceased beneficiary his or her descendants who 
survive distribution, and it does this even though the trust contains no 
language to support this or any other substitute gift.8 These changes are 
presented in the form of rules of construction.9 Nevertheless, these rules 
always apply unless they are expressly repudiated in a manner permitted 
by the statute.10 
Through § 2-707 its authors target poorly conceived and drafted trusts, 
namely, trusts that ignore core values within the mainstream of estate 
planning. These values are twofold: everyone wants to avoid unnecessary 
 4. The reformation of landlord-tenant law arose from both court decisions and legislation. See 
supra note 1. Reformation of the Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities, including its revision and in 
some instances its abolition, occurred largely during the last half of the twentieth century, and it was 
accomplished almost entirely by statute. See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW 
OF PROPERTY § 3.22 (3d ed. 2000). 
 5. The reformation of the common law rule against perpetuities during the last part of the 
twentieth century presents illustrations of each of these kinds of changes. On the one extreme are 
statutory changes that merely fine tune by, for example, restricting provisions with unnamed spouses 
to lives in being and thereby eliminating perpetuities violations produced by the remote possibility of 
an unborn spouse. At the other extreme are statutes that replace the possibilities test with one 
predicated upon actualities, provide for discretionary reformation in the event of a violation, and 
replace the life in being with a fixed term of years in measuring the period of valid enforcement. For a 
thorough discussion of a statute that makes all three of these changes, see Lawrence W. Waggoner, 
The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 21 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 569 (1986). For a 
summary discussion of the full range of reforms, see David M. Becker, Estate Planning and the 
Reality of Perpetuities Problems Today: Reliance Upon Statutory Reform and Saving Clauses Is not 
Enough, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 287, 356–65 (1986). 
 6. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-707 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 194 (1998). 
 7. See id. § 2-707(b). 
 8. See id. § 2-707(b)(1)-(2). 
 9. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-701 (amended 1991), 8 U.L.A. 181 (1998). As a rule of 
construction, § 2-707 can be overcome by evidence of a different intention held by the settlor of a 
trust. 
 10. See infra notes 77–90 and accompanying text for discussion of the restricted methods for 
overcoming § 2-707’s rules of construction. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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death costs, and everyone wants to keep their estate within their family 
and its constituent branches. As a result, skilled and experienced lawyers 
always expressly incorporate the condition and substitute gift imposed by 
§ 2-707.11 Proponents claim, therefore, that § 2-707 does not affect the 
word products of informed planners. Instead, it merely rewrites poorly 
designed trust provisions and thereby produces a result that all estate 
owners would prefer if they had been asked the right questions and given 
the right choices.12 
On its face, the effect of § 2-707 seems to be entirely salutary. 
Nevertheless, several commentators have criticized it severely. For 
example, one challenged the wisdom of its new default construction, 
especially without empirical proof that estate owners prefer it over the one 
long established by the common law,13 and I challenged the conclusion 
that § 2-707 will not affect the work and word products of skilled and 
experienced lawyers.14 Although these criticisms address different 
problems, each is implicitly concerned with the profound impact of 
§ 2-707 upon a body of law and the way it is practiced—indeed, an impact 
that reaches well beyond the particular condition of survivorship and 
substitute gift imposed by § 2-707.  
This article focuses and expands upon this transcendent impact. It 
elaborates how § 2-707 has made a major change in the common law 
paradigm for creation of property interests. This article predicts that the 
changes imposed by § 2-707—and any others it might spawn—will 
inevitably create serious problems because these changes impair a system 
of expression that is logically sound and has worked successfully for many 
centuries. In conclusion, it sounds a warning about all law reform and its 
 11. See Edward C. Halbach Jr. & Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC’s New Survivorship and 
Antilapse Provisions, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1091, 1132–33 (1992); Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform 
Probate Code Extends Antilapse-Type Protection to Poorly Drafted Trusts, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2309, 
2310–13, 2321–22, 2338, 2350–51 (1996). As a result of its condition of survivorship and substitute 
gift, § 2-707 should save estate owners from the negligence of lawyers who fail to ask the right 
questions and create the right provisions. Indeed, once one assumes that the implied condition of 
survivorship and the substitute gift imposed by § 2-707 would be preferred by essentially all estate 
owners and that an estate plan that provides otherwise could only arise because of neglect, lack of 
forethought, mistake, or inadvertence, surely one could then characterize the lawyer responsible for 
such an estate plan as negligent. Consequently, § 2-707 protects the public against bad trusts and bad 
lawyering. 
 12. See Waggoner, supra note 11, at 2310, 2313, 2338, 2349–51.  
 13. See generally Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Probate Code Upends the Law of Remainders, 
94 MICH. L. REV. 148 (1995). 
 14. See generally David M. Becker, Uniform Probate Code Section 2-707 and the Experienced 
Estate Planner: Unexpected Disasters and How to Avoid Them, 47 UCLA L. REV. 339 (1999). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss3/3
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hidden dangers, especially law reform which reflects the views of a select 
group, that alters the way lawyers must think, design, and draft. 
II. THE COMMON LAW PARADIGM AND ITS EFFECT ON THE CREATION OF 
INTERESTS  
A. The Common Law Paradigm  
The common law of property is complex,15 and the logic underlying its 
system for the creation of interests is no exception. Central to this logic is 
the notion that certain interests—estates—are measured and distinguished 
in terms of time. The holder of an estate commands a level of ownership 
that is described and classified in terms of acknowledged units of time. 
Such interest belongs to its owner until it expires or until she transfers it. 
As to the latter, whatever she holds remains hers until her unit of time has 
been exhausted by conveyances that add up to her quantum of ownership. 
As a result, one always creates—and therefore drafts—by addition. This 
addition continues until the transferor’s claim over time has been fully 
exhausted. Creation by addition is an inevitable consequence of the estate 
concept which allows for creation of possessory and nonpossessory 
interests that are defined by time units that are less than the whole. And 
this has had a direct bearing on how command thoughts for the transfer of 
property are formulated and how they are interpreted.16 
The foregoing principles—that a property interest is owned until it is 
transferred to others or until its defining unit of time expires—are 
accompanied by related principles. More specifically, in transferring one’s 
interest, or any portion of it, nothing is conveyed until one lawfully creates 
 15. The law of property is complex and difficult to master for many reasons. For example, with 
terms like “fee simple,” “fee tail,” and “vested subject to open,” it often reads like a foreign language 
to students. Further, certain words and phrases are assigned non-literal and often unnatural meaning. 
Within one context, “heirs” describes a group of people designated to receive an interest, but in 
another context, it describes the kind of interest those other than the heirs themselves are eligible to 
take. This leads to confusion, which also arises with the phrase “die without issue.” When given an 
“indefinite failure of issue” construction, the phrase leads to a fee tail instead of merely a condition of 
defeasance attached to a fee simple. Further, when the Rule in Shelley’s Case and the Doctrine of 
Merger are applied to a devise to “B for life, remainder to the heirs of B,” the heirs of B receive 
nothing while B takes the entire gift in fee simple absolute instead of the life estate clearly designated 
by the terms of the devise. Some of this complexity derives from policy and some from special 
interests. But all of it derives from history and none of it seems connected to logic. For a brief 
discussion of this terminology, these phrases, and these rules, see STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 
4, §§ 2.2, 2.10, 3.8, 3.16. 
 16. For further discussion, see, for example, GRANT S. NELSON, WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK, & 
DALE A. WHITMAN, CONTEMPORARY PROPERTY 219–23 (2d ed. 2002). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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an interest in another person or entity. Further, in creating such interests, 
one must begin with a blank slate—namely, a zero base for creation. With 
respect to transfers that must be in writing, nothing is created until it is 
expressed. If a particular interest is intended for a specific person, such 
interest does not exist without expression—without some basis for 
creation that is grounded in language.17 Because ownership can be divided 
both in terms of time and possession, multiple interests can be created 
simultaneously. This is accomplished by adding further to the zero base 
from which one always begins. If, however, one does not expressly add to 
the possessory interest which has a limited duration that is less than the 
estate held by the transferor, a reversion is retained, and it exists 
throughout the time of non-possession. Eventually the conveyed interest 
will exhaust itself in time, and, as a result, possession will revert to the 
transferor. Because nothing more has been stated, nothing more is created. 
If an interest isn’t there, then it isn’t there, and, therefore, it doesn’t exist. 
To be sure, there are exceptions, but the latter summary reflects the 
general rule, and courts hold steadfastly to it.18 
This principle can be readily illustrated. To begin with, assume that A 
owns Blackacre in fee simple absolute; therefore, A’s claim to 
Blackacre—on her behalf and on behalf of her successors—will last 
forever. A’s dispositive base is zero or a blank slate. Stated differently, 
A’s dispositive base is nonexistent and, therefore, remains at zero until A 
makes some kind of effective transfer of ownership. For example, B—who 
is unrelated to A—has no interest in Blackacre unless and until A executes 
a writing—operative during A’s life or at her death—that expressly creates 
an interest in B.  
Assume next that A does exactly that with a deed that provides “to B 
for life” and nothing more. Because no one else is mentioned in the deed, 
A has not relinquished her fee simple absolute. Only one interest has been 
added to the dispositive zero base or blank slate, and it is an estate of 
limited duration. Interests created by this deed do not add-up to A’s claim 
on ownership over time. No other interest is expressed; therefore, none 
exist in anyone other than A. Consequently, A holds a reversion and upon 
B’s death, possession reverts to A.19  
 17. Generally, nothing exists by way of transfer to another without words that identify who the 
transferee is and the quantum of estate she receives. In the presence of silence, courts will often supply 
the latter but not the former. Courts will seldom fabricate a gift without evidence derived from 
language and a context to support it. See infra notes 20, 64. 
 18. See infra notes 20, 64. 
 19. One should carefully observe, however, that only possession reverts to A and not A’s 
ownership interest, namely, A’s estate in fee simple absolute. Upon creation of B’s estate for life, A’s 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss3/3
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To continue this illustration, assume that A adds a second interest to 
the blank slate: “remainder to C for life.” To be sure, there has been an 
addition to the dispositive base. The original blank slate has been filled in 
with two successive life estates. Once again, however, this interest has a 
limited duration and the interests created by A’s deed do not add up to A’s 
claim on ownership measured over time. No other interests are expressed, 
and, therefore, none exist. So A continues to hold a reversion, and 
possession will revert to A upon the deaths of both B and C.  
Quite differently, suppose that the remainder to C states: “to C 
absolutely and forever.” Once again, without this declaration, C owns 
nothing in Blackacre; with it, however, C receives a fee simple absolute. A 
has moved beyond the blank slate and added two estates to the zero base 
from which she began. In this instance, however, these estates equal the 
unit of time A has had through her ownership of a fee simple absolute. 
Stated differently, A has drafted by addition, thereby creating time units 
that amount to a fee simple. Consequently, A’s transfer of ownership is 
complete. She has no reversion and, therefore, retains no interest in 
Blackacre.  
Courts will also hold to this equation of creation by addition—a 
process that begins with a zero base and does not recognize interests until 
they are designated and, therefore, exist—even when the language and 
context might support a probable intent to create an interest that otherwise 
has not been expressed. Indeed, courts are very reluctant to depart from the 
precept: if it’s not there, then it doesn’t exist. For example, consider this 
illustration in which A makes the following specific devise: “To B for life, 
remainder to C in fee simple absolute if B dies without children who 
survive him.” Building upon a zero base, A has expressly created interests 
in both B and C. The time units for B and C add up to A’s fee simple just 
the same as in the previous illustration. The remainder to C in fee simple 
is, however, conditioned upon B’s death without surviving children. 
Consequently, the interests created by A will add up to her own estate only 
if this condition is satisfied. If it is, then A’s reversion is extinguished and 
she retains nothing. 
What happens, however, if B leaves children who survive him? 
Clearly, C cannot take. Technically speaking, A’s reversion is not 
extinguished by C’s remainder unless the condition to C’s interest is 
possessory estate became nonpossessory, but it remained an existing estate even though possession 
was relinquished and deferred until a later time. A’s estate is commonly referred to as a future interest, 
but it is not a future estate. Throughout B’s lifetime A’s estate exists and with such existence A has 
immediate rights, including protection from waste and the capacity to transfer her reversion to others. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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satisfied. In this instance, however, it has not been satisfied. If no other 
gifts are raised by this devise, because A’s disposition is incomplete the 
subject matter will revert and pass with A’s residue in the event B is 
survived by children. One might speculate that A—or her lawyer—has 
overlooked this circumstance. Indeed, this seems to be an oversight, either 
in planning or drafting. Either way, one might conclude that A would want 
the remainder to pass to B’s living children instead of the residuary takers 
under A’s will. Nevertheless, courts will not easily reach this result 
because the dispositive equation did not include an express interest for B’s 
children. Stated otherwise, A did not add B’s children to her zero-based 
dispositive provision. The additions to the blank slate A began with 
included only B and, under certain circumstances, C. As to other 
unmentioned interests, once again, if they are not expressly there, then 
they do not exist, and courts are loathe to correct oversights by rewriting 
wills. To be sure, some courts will reach a different result because of a 
firm belief that the facts, logic, and language inevitably point to a 
remainder in B’s living children. Nevertheless, this is never accomplished 
without a steep uphill climb.20 
Once again, courts will not find interests until they are expressed. 
These interests, however, need not be fully elaborated; indeed, sometimes 
a short-hand expression will suffice. For example, suppose that A creates a 
testamentary trust that provides: “Income to H, my husband, for life; upon 
his death, the trust shall terminate and the principal shall be distributed 
one-half to B, my brother, if then living and one-half to C, my dear friend, 
if then living.” What happens if B survives H but C does not? Does the 
share that C would have had belong to B or does it revert back and thereby 
pass with A’s residue to someone else? Most courts would find in favor of 
the residuary taker. A cross remainder to B is unexpressed; therefore, it 
does not exist. Absent some other expressed gift—absent further addition 
to the dispositive equation that focuses squarely upon the failure of either 
B or C to survive H—this portion of the remainder must fail and, 
accordingly, pass with the residue.21  
 20. See LEWIS M. SIMES & ALLAN F. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 532, 841–42 
(John A. Borron, Jr., ed., 3d ed. 2002). For discussion of the approach courts take in the creation of 
future interests by implication in other kinds of situations, see id., §§ 843–45. 
 21. Cross remainders would provide “that B should take the entire principal if B survived H but 
C did not, and that C should take the entire principal if C survived H but B did not.” Sometimes courts 
will find cross remainders by implication. Ordinarily, however, they will not do so in the situation 
hypothesized. See id. § 843. If a court were to find that A had created a class gift in B and C, then B 
would be entitled to the entire principal. This construction, however, is extremely unlikely because of 
these particular facts: B and C were both named; B was a brother, and C was merely a friend; and their 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss3/3
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Suppose, however, that the trust contained a different provision for 
ultimate disposition of the principal. Assume that it stated: “(U)pon his 
death, the trust shall terminate and the principal shall be distributed in 
equal shares to my brothers then living.” Assume that A has two brothers, 
B-1 and B-2. Clearly, if both survive H, they will share equally in the 
distribution of principal. What happens, however, if B-1 survives H but B-
2 does not? Is the answer the same as the one in the original variation of 
this illustration? Does the share that B-2 would have had fail and pass with 
the residue? The answer is no, and all courts would award the entire 
principal to B-1.  
Their rationale would rest upon the nature of the gift of principal and 
the terminology used to confirm it. Courts will conclude that the 
remainder creates a class gift. The essence of every class gift is elasticity, 
a capacity to expand its membership or contract its membership or both. In 
this instance, although potentially there can be two class members at A’s 
death, the class is not fully defined until H’s death. Consequently, when B-
2 dies he drops out, and the entire principal then belongs to a class that 
only has one member by the time H dies. Quite differently, one might 
view the class gift as containing a built-in substitute gift to qualifying 
members; indeed, something that functions like cross remainders. 
However one views the class gift phenomenon, one cannot say that B-1’s 
claim to the entire principal derives from something unexpressed. Quite 
clearly, it derives from unambiguous class gift terminology. To be sure, 
substitute gifts and cross remainders are not fully elaborated; nevertheless, 
they are clearly presented through this well accepted short-hand.22 
One should also note that the principle of creation through additions to 
a zero-based blank slate applies to conditions as well as interests. Again, 
the dispositive slate is blank. The creative starting point is not subject to 
an overlay of conditions yielding uncertainty as to possession any more 
than it is subject to preordained interests. Stated differently, conditions 
concerning possession do not exist unless expressed. Once again, if they 
are not there, then they do not exist.23 This pronouncement is reflected in 
fractional interests were described and presumably fixed. All of this supports a finding that A was not 
group-minded and, therefore, did not intend a class gift. See id. §§ 612–13, 615. 
 22. For discussion of the significance and consequences of a class gift determination with respect 
to the shares and composition of the group, see id. § 613. 
 23. Nevertheless, there are courts that have lost their way and deviated from this basic precept. 
Sometimes these departures from prevailing law are tied to a specific language format, even those that 
give no hint of the condition courts supply. See infra note 28. Sometimes, however, deviant courts 
fabricate a condition without any tie to a symbolic language format, for example, when distribution of 
principal is deferred for a period of years and with that alone a condition of survivorship automatically 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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many ways, especially as to the body of law that distinguishes contingent 
and vested interests, because for an interest to be contingent, it must be 
subject to some condition that injects uncertainty. At the outset, however, 
one must understand that nonpossessory estates are automatically subject 
to a series of assumed conditions affecting possession, which, most of the 
time, remain unexpressed. For example, every nonpossessory estate is 
dependent upon the planet Earth not being destroyed and our system of 
private property still governing matters of ownership and transfer. To be 
sure, these kinds of conditions introduce uncertainty as to possession and 
they are always present. Nevertheless, fulfillment of such conditions is a 
common sense predicate to everything involving the law of property and, 
for this reason, they are completely disregarded and, therefore, never 
viewed as enough to construe an interest as contingent. 
One must, however, recognize and specifically account for another 
kind of assumed condition by adjusting the blank slate and its zero base. 
Possession of every nonpossessory estate is dependent upon the 
termination of all prior possessory estates. Sometimes this requirement is 
expressed; however, most of the time it is not. Clearly this presents a 
condition affecting possession and it may even infuse uncertainty 
respecting the time in which it will occur. This requirement, however, is 
never enough to raise a condition that permits characterization of the 
nonpossessory estate as contingent24 because one could never create and 
have a system of possessory and nonpossessory estates without it. All 
estates are measured in terms of time and each is defined in terms of its 
potential duration which, with the exception of the fee simple, must 
inevitably come to an end. Consequently, any division of ownership into 
possessory and nonpossessory estates will always delay possession of a 
future interest until a point in time, one that coincides with the expiration 
of some possessory estate or estates or finite period of time that has been 
added. Every nonpossessory estate is dependent upon this event. It is an 
inevitable condition every time one formulates a future interest in which 
arises. See, e.g., Smell v. Dee, (1707) 91 Eng. Rep. 360. See also SIMES & SMITH, supra note 20, 
§ 587. Further, some courts have found an unexpressed condition of survivorship merely because of 
the presence of another expressed condition having nothing to do with survivorship. Each of these 
fabrications has been criticized. See, e.g., SIMES & SMITH, supra note 20, § 594; see also Evan v. 
Giles, 415 N.E.2d 354, 357 (Ill. 1980). 
 24. “A remainder is contingent if, in order for it to come into possession, the fulfilment of some 
condition precedent other than the determination of the preceding freehold estates is necessary.” JOHN 
C. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 101 (4th ed. 1942). This is the classic first step in 
determining whether an interest is contingent, and its statement appears in probably the most famous 
work ever devoted to the law of future interests. 
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possession is triggered by the natural termination of prior possessory 
estates—that is, termination upon completion of a particular estate’s full 
potential duration. As a result, this ubiquitous condition that all prior 
possessory estates must terminate—even when expressed—should never 
be viewed as a new and added condition affecting possession, and 
certainly it should never be viewed as enough to create a contingent 
interest.25 Nevertheless, this requirement can be a source of confusion and 
it is sometimes mistaken for a condition enough to render an interest 
contingent. Therefore, to clarify the principle for imposing or determining 
the existence of conditions, one should probably amend this component of 
the common law paradigm by making the requirement for termination of 
prior estates explicit. 
Accordingly, one should say: All conditions respecting possession 
beyond requiring the natural termination of prior possessory estates 
must be expressed.26 This is the adjusted blank slate from which one 
begins to create conditions, and for a condition to exist it must be 
expressly added to this zero base. 
With some exceptions,27 this is also the way one determines the 
existence of vested interests. For an interest to be contingent it must be 
 
 
 25. If possession is expressly conditioned upon termination of a prior estate that is certain to end, 
such a requirement is invariably viewed as merely stating the obvious and is therefore inconsequential 
surplusage, which is insufficient to yield a contingency, such as a requirement of survivorship, and 
thereby render the interest contingent. See SIMES & SMITH, supra note 20, § 585. 
 26. Words of condition must be expressed in the sense that they are grounded in specific 
language or context. If unexpressed, there must at least be a basis for clear implication within the 
limitation itself or within the dispositive instrument. Conditions cannot be fabricated or imagined. 
Some things, however, are always assumed and usually they involve common sense; for example, birth 
is always a factual requisite to ownership of an interest by people and, therefore, birth translates into a 
condition. For further discussion, see SIMES & SMITH, supra note 20, §§ 131–66. 
 27. See GRAY, supra note 24. One should note, however, that the presence of a condition 
(beyond the termination of prior possessory estates) that must be satisfied at or before the natural 
termination of prior possessory estates does not always signify the presence of a “condition precedent” 
and therefore a contingent interest. Stated differently, conditions that must function precedent to 
possession are not always viewed as “conditions precedent.”  
Whether a remainder is vested or contingent depends upon the language employed. If the 
conditional element is incorporated into the description of, or into the gift to, the remainder-
man, then the remainder is contingent; but if, after words giving a vested interest, a clause is 
added divesting it, the remainder is vested. 
Id. § 108. One should observe that this test changes the meaning otherwise given to “condition 
precedent” and “condition subsequent.” This test focuses squarely upon the order of language and not 
on the operative effect of the condition itself. This can be illustrated with the following devise from A: 
“To B for life, remainder to C in fee simple; if, however, C predeceases B, then to D in fee simple 
absolute.” For C’s remainder to become possessory, C must survive B. This is a condition that 
coincides with B’s death, which is the natural termination of the prior possessory estate. Under these 
circumstances it represents a precedent requirement to possession and not a condition subsequent to 
possession because C ordinarily cannot have possession until B’s death, which is the operative time for 
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subject to a condition, and if there is no condition precedent to possession 
other than the natural termination of prior possessory interests, then the 
interest must be vested. To illustrate, assume once again that A makes the 
following transfer: “To B for life; thereafter, remainder to C in fee simple 
absolute.” There is only one apparent requirement for C’s interest to 
become possessory, namely, termination of B’s estate at B’s death. 
Because nothing else is expressly added to the zero base, one must 
conclude that there are no other conditions. If termination of B’s estate at 
B’s death were enough to make C’s interest contingent, then all 
remainders would become contingent. Once again, because courts do not 
view the natural expiration of prior possessory estates as a basis for 
finding a condition and, thus, a contingent interest, and because no other 
condition is expressed, the slate for creation of conditions is still blank. 
The dispositive base respecting conditions has not moved beyond zero; 
therefore, C has an indefeasibly vested interest.  
Suppose, however, that A were to add an express condition: 
“(T)hereafter, remainder to C in fee simple absolute if then living.” In this 
instance, the dispositive equation for conditions has moved beyond its zero 
base. One condition has been added: C must survive the death of B. It is, 
however, the only condition because the written equation expresses no 
others. For example, there is no added condition that C must attain age 
twenty-one, that C must marry, that C must graduate from college, or that 
C must be licensed to practice law. Once again, there are rare departures 
from the principle that conditions do not exist unless expressed, and often 
they reflect judicial misunderstanding of basic concepts and the paradigm 
for creation itself. Nevertheless, these deviations invariably derive from 
some kind of language format, even though a literal understanding of the 
language would not ordinarily yield the existence of another condition.28 
application of the condition. Nevertheless, because the condition appears in a clause after specific 
creation of the remainder in C, C’s remainder is classified as vested subject to divestment, and D 
receives a contingent executory interest. Using precisely the same conditions, however, one can alter 
the classification, thereby producing alternative contingent remainders in C and D. This can be 
accomplished by inserting the requirement of survivorship into the clause that first expresses an 
interest in C. “To B for life, and if C survives B, then to C in fee simple; if, however, C does not 
survive B, then to D in fee simple absolute.” See SIMES & SMITH, supra note 20, § 147. 
 28. One deviation is known as the “divide and pay over rule,” a rule that primarily applies to 
class gifts. Consider this testamentary trust created by A: “Income to B for life; thereafter, principal to 
B’s children.” With this gift there is an implied direction that at B’s death the trust will be terminated 
and that the principal will then be distributed equally to B’s children. And because the trust contains 
no express requirement of survivorship, an equal share would be distributed to the representative of 
any child of B who predeceased B. If, however, this implied direction had been actually expressed 
within the terms of the trust—for example, “upon the death of B the principal shall be sold and the 
proceeds then divided and paid over to the children of B”—some courts would find in that express 
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Further, when they are implied, in the absence of specific code words or 
phrases, there must be overwhelming evidence to support such condition. 
To be sure, then, the presence of one condition does not mean the 
implication of others any more than the complete absence of conditions 
supports the implication of any particular condition.29 
In the preceding illustration, there is one express condition to 
possession and it involves survivorship of the time for possession—
namely B’s death. Once again, the presence of this condition does not 
support the existence of others. The rationale for this conclusion—that 
specific conditions must be expressed by addition to the zero base, 
coupled with a dispositive equation that contains no express conditions 
other than the one for survivorship—should support a principle with 
broader application: namely, an expressed condition does not, without 
more, support the implication of any other condition. If the situation were 
reversed, this would mean that the presence of some other kind of 
condition should not yield a requirement of survivorship of possession if 
survivorship were unexpressed. This conclusion would be consistent with 
the common law paradigm that builds interests and conditions upon a 
blank slate. Nevertheless, it is not the conclusion courts universally reach, 
and once again these deviant results invariably reflect misunderstanding 
and misconception as to basic principles.30  
More specifically, suppose that the remainder to C in the previous 
illustration had been changed to read: “(T)hereafter, remainder to C in fee 
simple absolute if C has graduated from college by the time of B’s death.” 
This limitation contains only one condition—that C must graduate from 
college by the time of B’s death. Because it is the only expressed addition 
to the zero base for conditions, there should be no others. More 
specifically, there is no express requirement that C must also survive B; 
therefore, such condition should not exist. Consequently, if C were to 
graduate from college during B’s lifetime, C’s interest should then become 
indefeasibly vested and ultimately pass to C’s successors even though C 
direction for payment a basis for implying a requirement of survivorship of B. Their conclusion is 
always tied to such language, but their underlying reasoning is tenuous if not tortured. For discussion 
of the “divide and pay over rule,” see SIMES & SMITH, supra note 20, § 593. See also W. BARTON 
LEACH & JAMES K. LOGAN, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLANNING 323–29 (1961).  
 29. See SIMES & SMITH, supra note 20, § 594. 
 30. For example, see Drury v. Drury, 111 N.E. 140 (Ill. 1915). In this case, the Supreme Court of 
Illinois concluded that a contingent future interest created in a class was necessarily subject to a 
requirement of survivorship to the time of possession even though the condition that rendered the 
interest contingent did not express such a requirement. Id. at 142. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of 
Illinois repudiated this rule. See Evan v. Giles, 415 N.E.2d 354, 357–58 (Ill. 1980) (internal citations 
omitted). 
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thereafter failed to survive B. Indeed, the presence of a single condition—
even one that can only be satisfied during the remainderman’s lifetime—
does not automatically produce a further requirement that the 
remainderman must also survive to the time of possession. Nevertheless, 
some courts are tempted to go further and impute such a requirement of 
survivorship.31  
Additionally, the presence of an express condition that does not involve 
any kind of survivorship should not automatically yield a condition that 
does require survivorship. For example, consider this limitation: “To B for 
life, remainder to C in fee simple absolute if a Democrat is then President 
of the United States.” Although C’s interest is clearly contingent, the 
condition itself is not in any way dependent upon the life or death of C. 
Strictly interpreted, the remainder can vest in C or her successors without 
regard to whether she is alive or not at B’s death. The limitation expresses 
only one condition. Nothing more has been added to the blank slate; 
consequently, nothing more exists or is ordinarily found when a court 
must make its construction. Therefore, if a Democrat is President when B 
dies, C or C’s successor’s interest becomes possessory, and if a Democrat 
is not President when B dies, C or C’s successor’s interest fails. 
The problem, however, becomes a bit more complicated when a 
limitation expressly requires one remainderman to survive possession but 
not the other. For example, consider these alternative contingent 
remainders: “To B for life; thereafter, if C is then living to C in fee simple 
absolute, if C is not living then to D in fee simple absolute.” Clearly, C’s 
remainder is subject to an express requirement of survivorship, but D’s is 
not. Strictly interpreted, D’s remainder is alternative to C’s; that is, if C’s 
remainder fails because she does not survive B, D’s remainder vests and 
possession passes to D or his successors. Stated differently, C’s failure to 
survive B is the only express prerequisite to D’s possession. Nothing else 
is expressed, and so nothing more has been added to the zero base for 
creation of interests and conditions.  
Nevertheless, there are courts that sometimes find otherwise, namely, 
that two conditions exist for D. One is expressed—that C must predecease 
B—and the other is implied—that D must also survive B. These kinds of 
cases illustrate perhaps the most common breach of the common law 
paradigm, and often there is support for it among commentators. 
Invariably, this breach occurs because a court infers from the language and 
context that a requirement of survivorship for D was really intended by the 
 31. See supra note 30. 
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estate owner, and, therefore, its omission was clearly an oversight. In these 
cases, the inference is usually fact specific and not automatic. Despite the 
absence of specific language of survivorship to support this condition, 
courts have ruled that such a condition has been added to the blank slate. 
But in doing so, they generally must tie their conclusion to something that 
evidences its inclusion. Once again, nothing exists beyond the zero base 
without something to support it. For this reason, one might not view the 
implication of a requirement of survivorship for D as a real breach of the 
paradigm itself.32 
B. Some Important Exceptions 
The foregoing description of the system for creation of interests and 
conditions would be incomplete if one did not acknowledge the existence 
of some rules—often ancient—that can alter meaning. These principles—
derived from statutes and the common law—present an overlay that 
 32. Often the addition of an unexpressed requirement of survivorship reflects a court’s 
fundamental misconception of what it means to say that an interest is contingent. In the above 
example, D’s remainder is contingent in interest because of the express precedent condition that C 
must fail to survive B. But there is no express condition that renders D’s interest nontransmissible in 
the event D predeceases B. Without more, D’s interest is transmissible at death and will pass to D’s 
successors with ultimate possession still dependent upon whether C fails to survive B. Sometimes, 
however, courts will use the term “contingent” as an equivalent for nontransmissibility at death. They 
will assume that if something is contingent in interest, it must also be nontransmissible at death and, 
therefore, impliedly subject to a requirement of survivorship even though such requirement is 
unexpressed and is not the basis for characterizing the remainder as contingent in interest in the first 
place. Courts are most inclined to make this mistake when the contingent interest involves a class gift. 
See supra note 30. Many courts and commentators have, however, criticized this view. See SIMES & 
SMITH, supra note 20, § 594.  
 There are, however, circumstances in which a court has very good reason to infer a condition of 
survivorship and, therefore, to find a contingency beyond the express requirement that otherwise 
makes the nonpossessory estate contingent in interest. Consider this specific devise from A: “To B for 
life, then in fee simple to the children of B who survive B; if none, then to C for life, then in fee simple 
to the children of C who survive C.” Assume that B has one child, B-1, and that C has one child, C-1. 
Assume further this is the order of their deaths: A, C, C-1, B-1 and then finally B. Upon B’s death, B-
1’s estate cannot take the remainder because she has not survived B. C’s estate cannot take the 
alternative contingent remainder because C’s life estate has ended. But what about C-1’s estate? To be 
sure, it is subject to two express contingencies. B’s children must not survive B, and C-1 must survive 
C. Both conditions have been satisfied. There is no other express requirement. Does a result that favors 
C-1’s estate, however, make sense? Would A want the subject matter to become a part of C-1’s estate 
even though B-1 outlived C-1? One must remember that B’s children had a higher priority in this 
dispositive scheme than C’s children; after all, they were the recipients of the primary remainder in fee 
simple. Yet a literal application of all conditions yields a result for C-1’s estate and not B-1’s estate. 
Surely, this is something most estate owners would not prefer, especially respecting non-residuary 
gifts. Consequently, a court would have very good reason for finding a condition that C’s children 
must survive B as well as C and, therefore, allow the remainder to pass with the residue. For a decision 
that finds an implied requirement of survivorship under similar circumstances, see Irish v. H.J. Profitt, 
330 N.E.2d 861 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975). 
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controls language and the meaning it ultimately establishes. More 
specifically, they vary conditions and sometimes interests, and they do so 
even though there is no specific support for these changes within the 
language or context. The consequence in each instance is that the express 
language used does not mean what it seems to say, thereby compromising 
the integrity of the blank slate and the common law paradigm for creation 
of interests.33 The common law doctrine of lapse, which requires 
beneficiaries under a will to survive the testator, presents an excellent 
illustration of these rules.34 Anti-lapse statutes, which exist in nearly every 
state, do not eliminate this requirement. Instead, they provide a substitute 
gift to the living descendants of a limited group of beneficiaries.35 To 
illustrate, assume that A devises Blackacre: “To B in fee simple absolute.” 
The effect of the doctrine of lapse is to change the devise: “To B in fee 
simple absolute if living at my death.” Assuming that B is a child of A, the 
added presence of an anti-lapse statute changes the devise even further. 
The combined effect of the doctrine and the statute is the same as if the 
original limitation had read: “To B in fee simple absolute if living at my 
death. If not, then to the then living descendants of B by right of 
representation.”36 
As indicated earlier, § 2-707 applies to future interests held in trust, and 
it was intended to parallel the results achieved by the common law and 
anti-lapse statutes as to lapsed gifts.37 There is, however, an important 
difference in the reasons that underlie their respective requirements of 
 33. One example would involve a transfer from A to: “B and her heirs.” The literal meaning 
would suggest a gift to B and also to her heirs. But over time the phrase “and her heirs” came to be 
regarded as words of limitation indicating that B was to receive a fee simple absolute. And, over time, 
it became the predominant language format for expressing exactly that command. 
 34. A lapse arises when a beneficiary in a will, who is alive when the will is executed, dies 
before the testator. The interest fails because of the axiom that the recipient of a present interest must 
presently exist. In short, one cannot make a devise to a dead person. Consequently, the devise fails 
unless provision is expressly made within the instrument for a substitute gift. See THOMAS E. 
ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 140 (2d ed. 1953); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.5 cmt. a (1998). 
 35. Section 2-603(b) of the Uniform Probate Code, for example, includes deceased devisees 
(beneficiaries) who are grandparents, descendants of grandparents, or stepchildren of either the testator 
or the donor of a power of appointment exercised by the testator’s will, and it preserves such lapsed 
devise for the benefit of the devisee’s descendants who survive the testator. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-
603 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 164 (1998). Among the states, there are some significant differences 
within the group of devisees for whom a lapsed devise is preserved, but there are comparatively few 
differences with respect to the group substituted for the deceased devisee. For a summary of the 
differences among state laws concerning lapse, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP., supra note 34, 
§ 5.5, statutory note. 
 36. This is essentially the effect produced by the Uniform Probate Code. See UNIF. PROBATE 
CODE, § 2-603(b)(1).  
 37. See generally Waggoner, supra note 11. 
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survivorship. The lapse doctrine derives from something conceptual. 
Testamentary interests are created at death, and one cannot give to people 
who are dead and, therefore, nonexistent. They must exist before they can 
receive, and one who is already dead can never receive the gift.38 This 
conceptual problem does not arise for persons who do not predecease the 
testator but die before the time for possession, and so § 2-707 does not 
impose its survivorship requirement of a time beyond the testator’s death 
for this reason. Instead, § 2-707’s condition reflects an assumed choice 
that most people under most circumstances would prefer because they 
wish to avoid or conserve death costs and because they want their estate to 
remain within their family and its constituent branches.39 Section 2-707 
does not make future interests without requirements of survivorship and 
substitute gifts conceptually impossible; indeed, it allows for their 
creation.40 It does, however, revise the language of many instruments that 
deviate from the dispositive formats established by sophisticated and 
experienced estate planners. Its overlay reflects imputed choice and not 
basic conceptualization deemed necessary to a system of testamentary 
transfer. 
Lapse is not, however, the only doctrine or rule that establishes an 
overlay affecting the zero base and blank slate for creation of interests. 
Although they are now abrogated in nearly all jurisdictions, the Doctrine 
of Destructibility of Contingent Remainders and the Rule in Shelley’s 
Case are common law rules that always alter apparent meaning.41 The 
former requires contingent remainders to vest at or before the termination 
of all prior supportive freehold estates; otherwise they are destroyed. More 
specifically, consider this conveyance by A: “To B for life, then to C when 
she attains age thirty.” Presumably, A intends for C to take if she attains 
age thirty either before or after the death of B. The rule of destructibility, 
however, changes this meaning by destroying C’s remainder at B’s death 
if she is alive but not yet thirty. The rule effectively revises the language 
the same as if it had read: “To B for life, then to C if she attains age thirty 
by the time the prior estate terminates.”42 
 38. See supra note 34. 
 39. See supra note 11. 
 40. See infra notes 106–14 and accompanying text for discussion and illustrations of how one 
overcomes the requirements of § 2-707. 
 41. For a brief explanation of these two rules and a discussion of their current status, see 
STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 4, §§ 3.10, 3.16. 
 42. As previously stated, § 2-707 reflects imputed legislative choice based upon assumed intent 
of the estate owner and not upon a need to overcome conceptual obstacles derived from logic or 
history like the underpinnings of the doctrine of lapse. See supra note 34. The doctrine of 
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The effect of the Rule in Shelley’s Case is even greater. It applies 
whenever a freehold estate—almost always a life estate—is created in an 
ancestor and such estate is followed by a remainder in such ancestor’s 
heirs or heirs of the body. The effect of the rule is to transform the 
remainder into an added gift to the ancestor in fee simple or in fee tail. For 
example, consider this devise of land by A: “To B for life, remainder to 
his heirs.” As written, this language gives B merely a life estate. The 
remainder in fee simple is to a group of people who might potentially 
qualify as B’s heirs, and it is characterized as a contingent interest because 
of the requirement of survivorship inherent in the term “heirs.” The Rule 
in Shelley’s Case completely eliminates the gift to the heirs and the 
conditions attached to it; instead, the remainder belongs to B without any 
condition whatsoever. It effectively revises the language the same as if it 
had said: “To B for life, remainder to B in fee simple.” After applying the 
doctrine of merger, the gift then becomes: “To B in fee simple.” Clearly, 
this is something A did not intend to say or create. Nevertheless, the Rule 
in Shelley’s case applies because it is a rule of property and not a rule of 
construction that must give way to evidence of a contrary intent.43 
The common law offers other examples as well, particularly, rules that 
set limits to how individuals can encumber the interests they create. Two 
of these rules can be illustrated with a single example. Consider this 
transfer of Blackacre by A: “To the Centerville School District in fee 
simple provided such School District never transfers or conveys Blackacre 
to any other person or entity; if and when this absolute prohibition upon 
transfer or conveyance occurs, the School District’s interest shall terminate 
forthwith and be given over to C in fee simple absolute.” On its face, this 
limitation creates in the School District a fee simple subject to a 
contingent executory interest that is given to C in fee simple absolute.44 
destructibility is another example of a principle that derives from history and the conceptual challenges 
it presented. At its core was the concept of seisin and two of its characteristics: first, that there could be 
no livery of seisin in futuro, and second, that seisin could not be held in abeyance. See MOYNIHAN & 
KURTZ, supra note 2, at 169–77. 
 43. Rules of construction must give way to evidence of contrary intent. Section 2-707 presents a 
rule of construction. See supra note 9. The rules that govern distinctions between vested and 
contingent interest and the composition of class gifts are also rules of construction. The Rule in 
Shelley’s Case and the Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities, however, are rules of property that 
must apply even if one does not intend their application. Nevertheless, one should observe that there 
are times in which the distinction becomes blurred because often courts will apply a rule of 
construction even in the face of contrary intent. And, conversely, there are circumstances in which 
courts will bend the interpretation of language to avoid the application of the Rule in Shelley’s Case 
and the Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities. 
 44. The School District has a possessory interest with words of limitation that make it a fee 
simple. However, it cannot be a fee simple absolute because of the condition of defeasance that cuts 
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Two rules, however, must be satisfied under these circumstances; if either 
is violated, then the condition of divestment and the executory interest it 
introduces will fail. More specifically, the common law forbids direct 
restraints upon alienation—even when they take the form of a forfeiture—
imposed upon a fee simple, especially when such restraint is unlimited in 
scope and time.45 In this instance, the condition of defeasance imposed 
upon the School District constitutes a direct restraint. Because it is 
attached to a fee simple and is direct and unlimited, it is unenforceable 
and, therefore, the gift to C must fail. As a result, the School District’s fee 
simple defeasible becomes absolute.  
Quite apart from inclusion of an unenforceable direct restraint, the 
foregoing condition also introduces a violation of the common law rule 
against perpetuities.46 In this instance, the condition that forbids transfer is 
unlimited in time. Indeed, it can occur well beyond the deaths of A and C 
or anyone else alive at the time A executed his deed transferring 
ownership to the School District and C. Vesting of the executory interest 
created in C depends only upon a breach of the express condition—that 
the School District never transfers Blackacre to anyone. It does not require 
that C, or anyone else, be alive when the condition embodying the restraint 
upon alienation is violated. With this in mind, there is a perpetuities 
violation. More specifically, it is possible for C to die and devise her 
interest to C-1, a child born after A’s conveyance was made. Additionally, 
everyone else alive at the time of the conveyance—including A—can die 
thereafter, and the School District might then breach the condition more 
than twenty-one years later. As written, the executory interest would then 
vest in C-1 beyond the period of time allowed under the common law rule 
against perpetuities. As a result, the executory interest held by C-1 fails, 
and the School District’s fee simple becomes absolute. 
short the estate in the event Blackacre is ever conveyed. Because the giftover is to a third party, 
someone other than the transferor, C receives an executory interest rather than a possibility of reverter 
or a power of termination. 
 45. For full discussion of the various kinds of direct restraints and their validity, see SIMES & 
SMITH, supra note 20, §§ 1136–71. 
 46. In this illustration, although C’s contingent executory interest violates the common law rule 
against perpetuities, it may not violate the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities. The former 
rule presents a possibilities test which is tied to a measuring period consisting of lives in being plus 
twenty-one years. If there is any possibility for remote vesting, C’s interest violates the rule, and it 
must fail. The latter rule, however, presents an actualities test which is tied to a measuring period 
consisting of ninety years. An interest does not violate this rule unless after waiting for ninety years 
from the time it is created vesting has not occurred but may still happen at a later time. See UNIF. 
STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §§ 1(a)(2), 1(b)(2), 1(c)(2) (amended 1990), 8B U.L.A. 236 
(1998). Consequently, if the forbidden transfer by the School District occurs within ninety years, the 
condition and divestiture will be enforced, and C or C’s successors will then assume possession. 
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The foregoing rules superimpose upon the blank slate for creation an 
overlay of negatives that breach the common law paradigm in which 
silence means nothing.47 This overlay affects the zero base upon which 
lawyers build interests and conditions cumulatively. Unless these 
negatives are removed or overcome through skilled planning and drafting, 
creative language formats may not yield meanings lawyers intend to 
achieve. This overlay—also derived from the common law—often rested 
on reasons that had become obsolete. Because of this and the frustration of 
intent that inevitably resulted from their application, most of these rules 
have been moderated or eliminated. Both the Rule in Shelley’s Case and 
the Doctrine of Destructibility of Contingent Remainders have been 
abrogated in nearly all jurisdictions.48 Additionally, the Rule Against 
Perpetuities has been reformed in nearly all jurisdictions so that it is not 
nearly as harsh regarding both the requirements for a violation and its 
consequences.49 As a result, over the last century, the body of negatives 
has been significantly reduced and the common law paradigm and its zero 
base have been restored and greatly strengthened. Indeed, the slate for 
creation remains essentially blank so that interests and conditions still do 
not exist without a clear basis in language or context. 
C. The Effect of the Common Law Paradigm on the Way Lawyers Create 
Interests 
As one might expect, the systems lawyers use for the creation of 
interests derive from the common law paradigm. Lawyers begin with a 
zero base and they cumulatively build upon it the dispositive transfers 
their clients intend. In effectuating such transfers, lawyers do not, 
however, have unlimited discretion. Only certain kinds of estates are 
recognized and, therefore, can be created.50 These interests often require 
certain language formats to assure their formation.51 Once created, these 
 47. To be sure, the Doctrine of Destructibility and the Lapse Doctrine, along with its modern day 
anti-lapse statute counterpart, intrude upon the meaning of silence and the existence and scope of 
conditions, thereby breaching the common law paradigm. One should, however, observe that the Rule 
in Shelley’s Case, the Rule Against Perpetuities, and the Rule Against Direct Restraints go even 
further by altering both the literal and intended meaning of language. 
 48. See supra note 41. 
 49. For a summary of the reformation of the Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities, including 
its revision and in some instances it abolition, see STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 4, § 3.22. 
 50. The fee simple absolute is the largest estate, mainly because it is of potentially infinite 
duration. The fee simple can, however, be subdivided but only into a limited and fixed number of 
smaller estates. This rigidity—with exceptions—also extends to the attributes that attend each of these 
estates. For further discussion, see SIMES & SMITH, supra note 20, § 61; see also infra note 52. 
 51. Historically, creation of the fee simple by deed required a particular language format. And if 
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estates have certain attributes that can be varied within limits.52 With this 
in mind, the process for transfer begins with a blank slate—a dispositive 
base set at zero—and upon this slate one must build by adding the 
particulars of the intended transfer. This process uses positives and not 
negatives; indeed, it builds interests and the conditions attached to them by 
addition and not by subtraction. 
For example, assume that A begins with absolute ownership—a fee 
simple absolute—in a tract of land and wants to dispose of it completely. 
L, A’s lawyer, must transform A’s choices into reality, and she 
accomplishes this through expressed positives—expressed estates—that 
ultimately add up to A’s fee simple. In a sense, the process resembles 
creation of a shopping list that will match the amount of money one has to 
spend. L must formulate this list through positives that express what A 
wants and not through negatives that reject things A does not desire. If A 
wishes to invest full title in B by giving him a possessory fee simple 
absolute, L will not accomplish this by using negatives that set out all of 
the interests A does not intend. L will not say: “To B, not for life, not in 
fee tail, not for years, not from period to period, and not at will.” Instead, 
the fee simple will be created through positive affirmation by using 
language formats that confirm such estate.  
Further, if A wishes to condition B’s use of the land and make his fee 
simple subject to forfeiture, L must do so affirmatively. Without an 
express condition of defeasance such restriction does not exist. If it is not 
there in writing, then it is not there in substance. Indeed, L must take great 
care to express the species of defeasible estate A desires. Without 
symbolic language or full and accurate elaboration of the condition and the 
consequences of its breach, courts will not reach a construction that 
the transfer involved a devise, this same format was preferred and almost always assured creation of 
the fee simple. More specifically, the format required the phrase “and heirs” in addition to designation 
of the person or persons who were to receive the fee simple. See supra note 3. 
 52. For example, alienability is considered an essential feature of the fee simple. Indeed, one 
court has observed that without such attribute, the interest under consideration could not be a fee 
simple at all but rather a mongrel estate unrecognized by law. See generally Mandelbaum v. 
McDonell, 29 Mich. 78 (1874). Consequently, direct restraints against alienation imposed upon a fee 
simple have been deemed unlawful and, therefore, unenforceable. Nevertheless, conditions that 
indirectly restrain alienability have been permitted. As a result, forfeiture conditions that limit the 
manner in which land is used are enforceable. For example, a devise by A to “The Young People’s 
School so long as the land is used exclusively for a children’s preschool program; if and when not so 
used, the estate herein created shall automatically terminate and the land shall revert to A, her heirs 
and assigns” would be enforceable even though such condition significantly diminished the 
marketability of the land while owned by the grantee or its successors. For a brief summary of these 
principles, see NELSON, STOEBUCK, & WHITMAN, supra note 16, at 284–86. 
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renders the fee simple subject to forfeiture.53 But if the required language 
is present, then A has not conveyed away her interest completely. She 
retains the fee simple absolute by way of a possibility of reverter or a 
power of termination.54  
If, however, A wants to give B a lesser estate, then—once again—L 
must accomplish this through positive affirmation. L must not say: “To B, 
but not in fee simple.” Instead, L must say: “To B for life.”55 Without 
more, this does not exhaust A’s estate, which is in fee simple absolute. 
Accordingly, A retains a reversion and if she wants to avoid this, then the 
 53. Two important biases exist when courts must determine whether an instrument has created a 
defeasible estate. First, courts are loathe to find a forfeiture and, therefore, they will not find a 
defeasible estate unless the language properly fashions such an interest. Indeed, they much prefer to 
find some other legal relationship, such as a covenantor trust, and on occasion, they may even treat 
conditional language as precatory. For example, ordinarily, creation of a fee simple determinable 
requires language of special limitation (so long as, during, until, unless, etc.), and to ensure such 
construction, one should also add language that spells out a reverter that becomes possessory in the 
transferor automatically upon breach. Further, creation of a fee simple upon a condition subsequent 
ordinarily requires language of condition coupled with an express power of termination in the 
transferor that offers the option of recovering possession after the breach. Without more, language of 
condition or purpose will not suffice. If these requirements for creation are not fully met through use 
of the appropriate symbolic phrases, most courts will not find a fee simple defeasible. Second, if 
compelled to find some species of defeasible estate, courts much prefer to find a forfeiture that’s 
optional rather than automatic. Consequently, language that does not meet the rigid requirements for 
creation of a fee simple determinable ordinarily will be construed to be a fee simple upon a condition 
subsequent even though the limitation seems to reflect an intent to create a fee simple determinable. 
More specifically, if the limitation presents language of condition or purpose coupled with a 
declaration that upon breach the transferee’s interest shall become null and void and then revert to the 
transferor, many courts will find that the forfeiture is optional and not automatic. For full discussion, 
see SIMES & SMITH, supra note 20, §§ 247–49, 286–87. 
 54. Whether A retains a possibility of reverter or a power of termination depends upon the kind 
of defeasible fee simple she creates in B. If A creates a determinable fee simple in B, an estate that 
automatically terminates upon breach of the condition attached to B’s estate, then A retains a 
possibility of reverter. If, however, A creates a fee simple upon a condition subsequent in B, an estate 
subject to optional forfeiture upon breach of the condition, then A retains a power of termination. In 
either case, the species of defeasible estate created in B and the kind of interest retained by A will 
depend almost entirely on the language format used by A. See supra note 53. 
 55. When language designates a transferee without describing the interest received, courts 
always need a default construction of some kind that categorizes the kind of estate created. Under early 
common law, the life estate was the default interpretation if the transfer satisfied the requirements for 
creation of a freehold estate. For example, if a deed provided for a transfer from “A to B,” then 
without more B would have received a life estate. The transfer lacked words of limitation and without 
the required symbolic phrase—“and his heirs”—the conveyance would not effectively invest a fee 
simple of any kind in B. If not a fee simple, and if not declared to be some other kind of estate through 
additional language, it was by default assumed to create a life estate in B.  
 Today, however, the predominant default construction is the fee simple absolute. See 1 AMERICAN 
LAW OF PROPERTY § 2.4 (A. James Casner ed., 1952) [hereinafter AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY]. 
Ordinarily, if the formalities required for the conveyance of a freehold estate have been satisfied, 
creation of a fee simple absolute is assumed unless the language clearly indicates creation of a lesser 
estate. Once again, this default construction does not arise without positive affirmation of a transfer to 
someone, and skilled drafting will also utilize positive affirmation to define the kind of estate created. 
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list of estates created must include a fee simple that will vest and become 
possessory in some person or entity at some time. Putting this within a 
familiar context, A may have in mind a testamentary plan in which she 
expresses a desire to care first for her husband, H. Nevertheless, she 
ultimately wants her children to benefit from this tract of land and the 
other assets she owns. This presents a scenario that calls for a trust, with 
her husband to have an income interest for life and her children to have the 
principal absolutely and forever. 
Often, however, the process for creation is reversed. A begins with an 
idea of who is to have the subject matter absolutely. Further discussion, 
however, sometimes reveals a desire to benefit others as well, for example, 
family members whose needs might be more immediate and more acute. 
Consequently, possession of the fee simple—or in the case of a trust, 
distribution of the principal—must be deferred through the creation of 
prior possessory interests. In each instance, these prior interests must be 
affirmatively expressed. If they are not, then silence represents a gap in 
time, especially if possession of the fee simple has been deferred. This gap 
or failure to divest all of A’s interest is then viewed—as it nearly always 
is—as an incomplete disposition. As a result, this portion of A’s original 
interest essentially stays where it has been; namely, it still belongs to A.56 
If A is to divest her estate, then A must exhaust such ownership and she 
must sequence gifts through affirmative expressions that properly add up 
to the full measure of her estate—a possessory fee simple absolute.57  
Returning to the example involving A, her husband H, and their 
children, A may wish to include some conditions and substitute gifts after 
considering the impact of death costs and the possibility that the subject 
matter may be diverted from her family through the estates of deceased 
children. More specifically, L might recommend that the gift of principal 
to the children should be subject to a condition of survivorship of the death 
 56. For example, if A were to make a specific devise of Blackacre to “B and her heirs upon the 
expiration of twenty years following my death,” then silence as to who benefits during the twenty-year 
period of time would constitute a gap in the dispositive design. Presumably Blackacre would remain a 
part of A’s estate and, accordingly, belong to the residue until twenty years had elapsed. 
 57. If A, who has a possessory fee simple absolute, elects to convey a fee simple absolute to C 
with possession deferred until a specific event occurs, complete disposition of A’s interest would 
require creation of an additional interest or interests that add up to the full time in which C’s 
possession has been deferred. For example, if A defers possession of C’s fee simple absolute until 
twenty years have expired, A must fill in the twenty-year gap with other estates. A ten-year estate in B 
would not suffice, and so A must respond with another estate or estates that last an additional ten 
years. Nor would a life estate in B suffice because B might die before the twenty years has expired. In 
this instance, A must fill in the potential gap by creating estates that are certain to last until C’s 
possession commences. 
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of H; for example, “after the death of H, the principal shall then be 
distributed to my then living children absolutely and forever.” This would 
remove it from the estates of deceased children, thereby avoiding estate 
taxes at their respective deaths and preventing them from passing their 
remainder to those outside of A’s family.58 With this condition and 
nothing more, the share of any deceased child would be absorbed in the 
class gift that remained for the survivors.59 One should note, however, that 
this gift becomes incomplete if all of A’s children were to predecease H. 
No affirmative expression exists and because of this possibility, the 
disposition is incomplete and A retains a reversion in fee simple. 
Therefore if all children predeceased H, the principal would then revert to 
A and pass with the residue of her estate.  
Neither of these results may fully satisfy A. If a deceased child has 
living descendants, she may favor these descendants over other surviving 
children. Further, she may not want the subject matter of the trust to pass 
with the residue in the event the gift of principal were to fail completely. 
Consequently, L must inform A of the possible misdirection of principal 
and the gap that might render the disposition incomplete, explain the 
choices A has, and then affirmatively set out the dispositive design A 
elects. Once again, these choices must be made through positive 
expressions that add to the zero base from which L begins to build A’s 
choices. As a result, L must identify the gap—especially those that seem 
remote, such as all of A’s children predeceasing B—and then set out to 
whom the principal should pass under these circumstances. For example, 
assuming A opts for a substitute gift to living descendants of a deceased 
child and a gift over to a charity in the event B is not survived by any of 
A’s descendants, L might add the following language: “. . ., the living 
 58. By conditioning the future interest given to children upon the death of H, A has removed the 
principal from the gross estate of children who do not survive. Conversely, if the future interest were 
transmissible at death because it was not subject to a requirement of survivorship, it would be included 
within the estate of a deceased child just the same as any interest that had become possessory before 
such child’s death. See 26 U.S.C. § 2033 (2000). Further, because the expenses incurred in estate 
administration are ordinarily a function of the size of the estate, and because the estate of a child who 
predeceased H would not include a share of the principal, such requirement of survivorship would also 
offer savings regarding these death costs. Finally, because of this condition of survivorship, the share 
of any child who predeceased H would belong to children who survived H. Consequently, such 
condition would also assure retention of the principal within A’s family as to the shares of children 
who predeceased H. This would not be true, however, in the absence of a requirement of survivorship. 
Although a child cannot circumvent the statutory share of his surviving spouse, and although he must 
satisfy the requirements of a pretermitted heir statute, he can devise his transmissible future interest 
just the same as he could have devised it if he had survived the time for possession and distribution of 
principal, which means in the end that such child can divert his share from A’s family. 
 59. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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descendants of any deceased child to take his or her interest by right of 
representation; further, if B is not survived by any of A’s descendants, the 
principal shall then pass to ‘X’ charity.” 
This strategy for creation is inevitable whenever conditions are 
imposed. For every contingency that is added, one must account for both 
its compliance and its breach. If a future interest in Z, a person, is made 
contingent upon survivorship of the time for distribution, one must build 
an express consequence—an express alternative—in the event Z fails to 
survive such point in time.60 Further, if one adds additional conditions, 
such as attainment of age twenty-five, then one must provide an answer 
for the various combinations of compliance and breach that can arise. To 
be sure, the common law affords a result by default.61 Once again, courts 
are disinclined to supply unexpressed conditions or find unexpressed 
substitute gifts. Further, if a gap exists because of a failure to anticipate the 
circumstance and explicate a solution, the subject matter reverts. As a 
result, sometimes the future interest will fail altogether, and at other times 
 60. There are, however, some circumstances that one might view as an exception because the 
limitation already contains an unexpressed built-in solution in the event a future interest fails because a 
condition is not satisfied. Consider, for example, this specific devise by A of a defeasible fee simple: 
“To B in fee simple; however, if B dies without surviving descendants, then to C in fee simple 
absolute if then living.” Suppose that C survives A but predeceases B and, thereafter, that B dies 
without ever having had descendants. Some courts would treat B’s fee simple as if it were 
determinable and automatically cause the subject matter to revert to A’s estate. Others would, in the 
absence of a condition or other contextual facts confirming an intent to terminate B’s interest under 
these circumstances, find that B’s interest becomes absolute. They would observe that B’s fee simple 
is subject to an executory interest and is not by its terms determinable. Consequently, that which is 
vested remains vested until and unless the precise occasion for divestiture arises. That circumstance 
has not occurred—C did not survive B—and, therefore, B’s interest remains exactly where it is. 
Silence continues to mean nothing in the sense that the interest stays put unless and until something 
else by way of a substitute gift is expressed or made abundantly clear. For further discussion, see 
SIMES & SMITH, supra note 20, § 824.  
 61. Suppose, for example, that the principal were to pass at H’s death to “such of my then living 
children who attain age twenty-five absolutely and forever.” As written, to become eligible, a child 
must satisfy both conditions. This much is clear: a child is excluded from the group gift if she attains 
twenty-five before the death of H but does not survive H. Similarly, she is excluded if she survives H 
but does not thereafter attain age twenty-five. Those who do satisfy both requirements are entitled to 
share the entire gift of principal. What happens, however, if the last to die survives everyone 
involved—H and A’s children, including those who have already joined the class by satisfying both 
conditions—but does not attain age twenty-five? Presumably, this share will be absorbed by the gift to 
children who have previously qualified. Yet this may not be the result desired by A under these 
circumstances. A might prefer a giftover of such presumptive share to another person or group. The 
logical choice would be the then living descendants of deceased children. Indeed, A might want to 
assign the highest priority to this group for any child who had descendants but did not qualify as a 
class member. Addition of this kind of choice increases the complexity significantly because one must 
always account for the failure of either condition or both conditions in explicating a dispositive 
selection. For a related illustration, see In re Bilham, 2 Ch. 169 (1901). 
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it remains in abeyance until the condition is met or can never be 
satisfied.62  
Once again, because conditions heighten the importance of previewing 
the full range of alternatives they occasion, the common law paradigm 
calls for meticulous building of express conditions and substitute gifts that 
respond to every possibility. In the end, one must make certain that the 
express dispositive components appearing on the slate—which begins as 
blank and has a zero base—add up to the full measure of what the 
transferor holds and wishes to convey.63 Although the conditions 
themselves may negate interests otherwise created, the dispositive 
equation itself is always accomplished through positive expressions. In 
short, nothing moves by way of disposition unless expressed.64 
Accordingly, the process for creation must inevitably focus on exactly 
that. One must set out the basic idea, anticipate the gaps or oversights in 
the design, and then fill them with further expression. 
 62. For example, consider a devise from A that creates a life estate in B, followed by remainder 
to C in fee simple, which is subject to a condition with a substitute giftover to D. If C’s remainder is 
contingent, and if the condition cannot be fulfilled beyond the death of B (such as a requirement that C 
survives B), then the substitute gift to D should control if C does not satisfy such condition. If, 
however, one adds a second condition not fulfilled by the time of B’s death, but capable of fulfillment 
after the death of B (such as attainment of age thirty), or if such condition is the sole contingency, then 
the giftover to D will not control unless C’s interest is deemed to fail and the gift to D by its terms 
must take effect in the event C’s interest fails for any reason. In the absence of such language, a court 
might have both C’s and D’s interests fail either because of the rule of destructibility applicable to 
contingent remainders, see supra note 41, or because the provision contained language indicating that 
full compliance must occur by the time of B’s death. If the interests of C and D do not automatically 
fail for either of these reasons, vesting will be held in abeyance and the subject matter will temporarily 
revert back to A’s estate until C does or does not attain age thirty after the death of B. These results—
failure and reversion back to A’s estate or abeyance and temporary reversion back to A’s estate—will 
obtain if the remainder to C is classified as contingent. If, however, it is deemed vested subject to 
divestment, the subject matter (and with it the benefits of interim income) will remain in C until C 
does or does not attain age thirty. In the event of the former, C’s interest becomes absolute, but if the 
latter occurs, C’s interest will then be divested in favor of D. 
 63. Usually this adds up to the full measure of the transferor’s interest. There are, however, 
instances in which the full measure of what the transferor wishes to convey is less than the estate she 
holds. This would be true when the gift is non-residuary and the residue is intended to be the ultimate 
repository for certain contingent interests that have failed because their dependent conditions have not 
been satisfied.  
 64. This is usually accomplished through clear delineation of specific interests. However, it 
sometimes arises by implication as a result of ambiguous language. Nevertheless, courts are reluctant 
to fabricate unexpressed interests. Implied interests are almost always grounded upon some kind of 
language and the estate design it evidences. 
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III. SECTION 2-707 AND ITS IMPACT ON THE COMMON LAW PARADIGM 
AND THE CREATION OF INTERESTS 
A. Illustrations of How and When § 2-707 Deviates From the Common 
Law Paradigm 
Section 2-707 invents conditions and substitute gifts not found in 
clearly expressed trusts, and in specific instances it yields distributions to 
people who were never intended to benefit. But the impact of § 2-707 is 
even greater because of the way it alters the common law paradigm for the 
creation of interests. Indeed, if lawyers do not preempt its application to 
the trusts they draft, it can lead to profound changes in the way interests 
are created and dispositions are made. As described earlier, § 2-707 
presents merely two changes to the law of future interests, but they are 
very significant.65 First, it requires beneficiaries of all future interests 
created by trust to survive the time for distribution, and it does this even 
though such condition is neither expressed nor implied. Second, for a 
beneficiary who fails to satisfy this condition of survivorship—whether 
expressed or imposed by § 2-707—§ 2-707 fabricates a substitute gift to 
the living descendants of such deceased beneficiary, and it does this even 
though such gift is not expressed or implied. The latter change tracks the 
pattern of substitute gifts created by the anti-lapse provision under the 
same Code. Unlike most anti-lapse statutes, however, application of 
§ 2-707 is not limited to certain groups of relatives, but instead it applies 
to all beneficiaries—even those who are unrelated to the estate owner.66 
These changes can be illustrated. Consider the following testamentary 
trust created by A: “Income to B for life; following B’s death, the 
principal shall be distributed to C absolutely and forever.” Because no 
requirement of survivorship by C is expressed, then none exists under the 
common law paradigm; consequently, the principal will pass at B’s death 
to C if living or, if dead, to C’s successors.67 Under § 2-707, however, C 
must survive the death of B—the time for distribution—otherwise C’s 
 65. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. 
 66. Section 2-603(b), the anti-lapse provision of the Uniform Probate Code, is limited to devisees 
who are grandparents, descendants of a grandparent, or stepchildren of either the testator or the donor 
of a power of appointment exercised by the testator’s will. See supra note 35. Most anti-lapse statutes 
similarly confine protection of lapsed devises to relatives. Some, however, protect lapsed devises 
created in all devisees. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP., supra note 34, § 5.5, statutory note 3. 
 67. One should note that C could convey C’s interest before B’s death through an inter vivos 
transfer or (in the event of C’s death) through a testamentary devise. Consequently, C’s successor 
could acquire C’s interest in the principal before the trust had terminated and before possession had 
been conferred. 
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interest will fail.68 Because of § 2-707, one must now interpret the 
foregoing trust provision the same as if it had said: “(F)ollowing B’s 
death, the principal shall be distributed to C absolutely and forever if then 
living.” 
If A had expressed this same survivorship requirement—and nothing 
more—under the common law paradigm, the gift of principal would have 
reverted back to A’s estate if C predeceased B. The only remainder created 
by A was in C. Because the trust contained no substitute gift, disposition 
of the principal was incomplete, and, accordingly, the subject matter must 
revert. If the creative slate elaborates no substitute gift, then the slate must 
remain blank in this regard. If it is not there, then it does not exist. 
Nevertheless, under § 2-707 this result would not obtain. It fabricates an 
automatic substitute gift to the living descendants of the deceased 
beneficiary.69 Consequently, if C predeceases B and leaves descendants 
alive at B’s death, the principal will pass to them. Therefore, once one 
combines the two main requirements of § 2-707, the original trust 
provision must be interpreted the same as if it had said: “(F)ollowing B’s 
death, the principal shall be distributed to C absolutely and forever if then 
living. If C predeceases B, then the principal shall be distributed to C’s 
descendants alive at B’s death to take by representation.” 
As previously discussed,70 if the trust principal had been left to a 
class—for example, A’s siblings—a requirement that class members must 
survive B would not cause the gift of principal to fail unless all members 
predeceased B. Because a class gift implicitly carries with it a built-in 
substitute gift to class members who satisfy all requirements for inclusion, 
A’s siblings who survive B would always be entitled to receive the entire 
principal. Class gifts are used because of their elasticity, something that 
gives them a capacity to expand and contract in size.71 The rules of 
 
 
 68. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE, § 2-707(b) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 194 (1998). Even with a 
statutory substitute gift to C’s descendants, see infra note 69, one should carefully observe that C’s 
privilege to own and transmit the absolute interest in the principal is terminated the moment C fails to 
survive B. C’s claim to an interest that lasts forever, and with it the ability to control its ownership 
following his death, fails and is extinguished completely even though C’s living descendants will take 
in his place. C’s descendants do not take directly from C. They take as a result of a statutory choice 
made on behalf of A just the same as if A had expressed it herself. The statutory requirements of 
survivorship and the substitute gift to C’s living descendants cut off and displace C’s interest, and as a 
result, the descendants take as successors to A and not C.  
 69. See id. § 2-707(b)(1), (b)(3). 
 70. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 71. In all likelihood a class gift to A’s “brothers and sisters absolutely and forever who are alive 
at B’s death” would present a class gift subject to contraction only and not expansion. Given the fact 
that A is the estate owner, and quite clearly into adulthood, expansion of the class of brothers and 
sisters has undoubtedly become impossible or improbable because A’s parents may not be alive or 
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construction, therefore, that govern their composition seem to be an 
accurate reflection of what people intend. Indeed, if A had provided that 
the gift of principal were to be distributed to “my brothers and sisters 
absolutely and forever who are alive at B’s death,” one might justifiably 
assume that A intended to restrict the gift to surviving siblings and not to 
include the surviving descendants of deceased siblings.  
Once again, however, § 2-707 alters this result.72 If there is no express 
requirement of survivorship, then § 2-707 adds such condition along with 
the substitute gift to descendants. But § 2-707 also goes further in stating 
that express conditions of survivorship are not, without more, enough to 
overcome its requirements.73 This means that language that otherwise 
restricts a class to surviving members will not be interpreted in that 
manner. Instead, those who survive must share the principal along with the 
living descendants of those who did not. 
One should also observe that the foregoing requirement—that words of 
survivorship are not enough to overcome § 2-707’s rules of construction—
superimposes a condition of survivorship of the time for distribution even 
when the trust includes express conditions of survivorship that are 
unrelated to the time for distribution.74 Consider this testamentary trust 
that disposes of the residue of A’s estate: “Income to H, my husband, for 
life; thereafter, the principal shall be distributed to D, my daughter, if she 
attains age thirty. If, however, she does not attain age thirty, then the 
principal shall be distributed to the Washington University School of 
Law.” Suppose D attains age thirty but predeceases H. Once again, the 
common law paradigm begins with a blank slate. If a condition is 
expressly added to the zero base, then the slate is no longer blank. 
Nevertheless, the paradigm only accounts for the announced condition. 
Unexpressed requirements simply do not exist. Consequently, having 
attained age thirty, D would acquire an indefeasibly vested interest that 
likely to have additional children. If, however, A’s gift of principal were to “B’s children absolutely 
and forever who are alive at B’s death” and B had expectations of more children, then the class gift to 
B’s children would be subject to expansion and contraction. For example, assume that when the gift is 
made by A, B had two children, B-1 and B-2. Assume thereafter that B-1 predeceased B and that B 
had two additional children, B-3 and B-4. Because A had used group terminology that signified 
creation of a class, and with it had wanted to attach the consequences of a class gift, courts would 
assume that A intended to make all the children B might have eligible for membership. Consequently, 
following creation of the gift the group would expand and B-3 and B-4 would become eligible for 
inclusion. However, because B-1 failed to satisfy the requirement of survivorship, he would be 
dropped from the group which would contract and ultimately include only B-2, B-3, and B-4.  
 72. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-707(b)(2), (b)(3). 
 73. See id. § 2-707(b)(3); id. § 2-707 ex. 6. 
 74. See id. § 2-707(b)(3). 
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would pass to her successors in interest without regard to whether she 
thereafter survived H.  
This is not, however, the result commanded by § 2-707. Absent 
additional evidence,75 § 2-707 would control, and its statutory requirement 
that the beneficiary of a future interest must survive the time of 
distribution would not be averted. Under § 2-707, it is not enough that A 
apparently contemplated survivorship, but only expressed a condition 
pertaining to age. The statutory fabrication involving a requirement of 
survivorship of the time for distribution will alter the landscape of the 
creative slate—no matter how many other conditions are expressed—
unless it is repudiated in a manner permitted under the statute.76 The 
foregoing changes caused by § 2-707 have great significance because they 
infuse conditions and substitute gifts into trusts even though the expressed 
additions to the creative slate reveal no evidence of or basis for their 
existence.  
To be sure, because § 2-707 is merely a rule of construction, one can 
create a trust that deviates from its requirements. More specifically, the 
statutory substitute gift to the living descendants of a deceased beneficiary 
of a future interest can be preempted by the express creation of an 
alternative future interest.77 For example, reconsider the foregoing 
illustration in which the future interest is subject to an express requirement 
of survivorship of the time for distribution and possession: “Income to B 
for life; following B’s death, the principal shall be distributed to C 
absolutely and forever if then living.” Once again, if C predeceases B but 
leaves descendants who survive B, § 2-707 compels distribution of 
principal to such descendants instead of reverting back to the estate of A, 
the transferor. If, however, A had expressly created an alternative future 
interest in D—for example, “if C is not then living, the principal shall be 
distributed to D absolutely and forever”—such alternative gift should 
preempt the statutory substitute gift to C’s living descendants. 
 75. See supra note 9. In all probability, the additional evidence needed to overcome the statutory 
requirement for survivorship of the time of distribution must include either explicit negation of such 
condition or a blanket negation of § 2-707 and all of its requirements. See infra notes 103–12 and 
accompanying text. 
 76. Once again, § 2-707 presents merely a rule of construction. See supra note 9. Presumably, 
then, this far-reaching statutory requirement of survivorship can be overcome with language that 
repudiates it. Nevertheless, by clearly expressing what is not sufficient to overcome the condition 
requiring survivorship of the time for distribution, the statute sets ground rules that seem to dismiss 
techniques based upon clear inference. Consequently, one must develop unambiguous techniques of 
repudiation that work successfully and without fail. See infra notes 103–12 and accompanying text. 
 77. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-707(b)(4) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 194 (1998). 
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One must, however, recognize that § 2-707 imposes several important 
qualifications to preemption that ultimately restrict and prevent it from 
occurring and, therefore, tamper even further with the common law’s 
paradigm for the creation of interests. To begin with, all alternative future 
interests are subject to the same statutory condition of survivorship of the 
time for distribution even though the language does not include78 or even 
support such requirement.79 For example, in the foregoing illustration, 
assume that the trust involved A’s residuary estate, and that A’s “end gift” 
of principal was the one to D. Once again, under the common law 
paradigm, a condition does not exist unless expressed. A’s substitute gift 
to D is predicated upon one condition only—that C is not alive at B’s 
death. Consequently, if both C and D predeceased B, the remainder will 
vest in D and the principal will pass to D’s successors in interest.  
Section 2-707, however, dictates a different result. And that result will 
depend upon whether C and D have descendants and whether D is a 
descendant of C.80 To begin with, under no circumstances will the 
principal pass to D’s successors as it would under the common law. 
Further, even though A’s substitute gift to D is intended as an “end gift”—
a final catch-all receptacle—the principal would pass to A’s heirs at law if 
neither C nor D left descendants alive at B’s death.81 And these heirs at 
law would be determined as if A had died at the time of B’s death. Clearly, 
this would yield a result at odds with not only the common law paradigm 
 78. Section 2-707 requires that the designated beneficiary of an alternative future interest be 
entitled to take in possession or enjoyment. See id. § 2-707(b)(4). Because an alternative future interest 
is still a future interest, it cannot take effect in possession or enjoyment without satisfying § 2-707’s 
universal requirement of survivorship of the date for distribution. 
 79. This requirement of survivorship would apply even though the alternative future interest 
constituted the end gift of the residue and failure of such interest might yield an intestacy. Intestacy is, 
of course, a result that courts presume estate owners do not prefer.  
 80. Assuming that C has living descendants but D does not and that both predecease B, C’s 
descendants would take the principal because D’s alternative future interest would not become eligible 
to supersede the substitute gift to C’s descendants. See supra note 78. If, however, D has living 
descendants but C does not, then D’s descendants would take the principal. C’s primary remainder 
would fail because C failed to survive and had no substitute living descendants. D’s alternative future 
interest would fail because D did not survive. However, because the statute provides a substitute gift to 
living descendants for all future interests in which the beneficiary fails to survive, such substitute gift 
to D’s descendants would take effect. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-707(b)(1). Assume, however, that 
both C and D predecease B and that both leave living descendants. In this event, a very complicated 
provision controls the determination as to which setoff living descendants prevails. This determination 
is ordinarily made in favor of the descendants of the holder of the primary future interest—C’s 
descendants—unless D’s remainder qualifies as a younger-generation future interest, for example, if D 
were a child of C. In that event, the descendants of D would take the principal. See id. § 2-707(c). 
 81. If there are no surviving takers because neither C nor D survives B and because neither C nor 
D has descendants then living, § 2-707 provides that the principal is to pass to A’s heirs if the trust was 
created by a residuary devise in A’s will. See id. § 2-707(d). 
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but with A’s intent as well, especially if A’s will did not include any of the 
heirs who might ultimately benefit under his residuary trust.82  
This requirement of survivorship imposed by § 2-707 upon the 
beneficiary of the alternative future interest is not, however, the only 
prerequisite to preemption of the substitute gift to living descendants of a 
deceased beneficiary of a future interest. Returning to the previous 
example, assume that the trust does not involve the residue, which in this 
instance is devised outright to D absolutely and forever. Nevertheless, in 
this illustration the result would seem to be the same because the giftover, 
in the event C does not survive B, is expressly made to the residue. With 
this in mind, the trust would provide: “Following the death of B, the 
principal shall be distributed to C absolutely and forever if then living, and 
if C is not then living, the principal shall be distributed and pass with the 
residue to the residuary taker.” Assume that C predeceases B, but leaves 
descendants who survive B. Further, assume that D also survives B. Who 
is entitled to the trust principal? 
Clearly, because C has predeceased B, C does not have an interest 
under the trust that is transmissible at death. The terms of the trust indicate 
that the principal must pass to the residuary taker, D. This would be 
consistent with the result reached under the common law paradigm. Once 
again, if there is a condition of survivorship that is breached, absent an 
express substitute giftover the remainder fails. A substitute gift is 
nonexistent until and if it is expressed. Accordingly, the disposition is 
incomplete, and the principal reverts and passes with the residue. The 
language within the provision itself expresses a substitute gift, but it is to 
the residuary taker. Accordingly, it merely spells out what would 
otherwise occur under the common law paradigm, but in doing so it 
clearly reveals A’s intent and determination that D should take by way of 
substitution for C. 
Section 2-707, however, alters this result. Section 2-707 does classify 
the residuary gift as a future interest,83 but it expressly precludes it from 
becoming an alternative future interest capable of preempting the statutory 
substitute gift to living descendants of the primary beneficiary—C. 
 82. If none of the beneficiaries of A’s lifetime transfers and under A’s will—including the 
residuary trust—were potential heirs at law, one might readily assume that A did not view his family 
as the objects of his estate. And it would be no stretch to assume that A wanted to exclude them. To be 
sure, a statement saying exactly that might be enough to overcome § 2-707(d) because, after all, it only 
establishes a rule of construction. See supra note 9. Nevertheless, one cannot know for certain what a 
court would conclude. Consequently, at the very least, this circumstance would invite litigation 
between D’s successors and the heirs of A. 
 83. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-707(d)(1) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 194 (1998). 
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Further, this preclusion obtains under § 2-707 even when a nonresiduary 
devise specifically provides—as in this illustration—that a failed gift shall 
pass with the residue.84 Consequently, despite the explicit direction that 
the residuary taker, D, is to receive the principal in the event C 
predeceases B, the remainder will instead pass to C’s surviving 
descendants. They will prevail even though the language states otherwise 
and even though the trust contains no substitute gift on their behalf or even 
mentions them.  
One should note that the foregoing departure from the common law 
paradigm presents something qualitatively different from the previous 
illustrations. Each of the others deviated from the paradigm’s blank slate; 
namely, as a general rule, unexpressed conditions and gifts do not exist. 
Without some basis in language or context, courts will not add conditions 
or gifts beyond what is clearly expressed. And in the previous examples, 
§ 2-707 adds conditions or gifts or both, but it is under a backdrop of 
silence. One would have assumed their nonexistence only because of 
silence—nothing upon the inscribed slate reflected their presence. In this 
example, however, § 2-707 goes further. To be sure, it fabricates a 
nonexistent substitute gift to C’s living descendants, but it does this in the 
face of an express substitute giftover to the residuary taker, D. By negating 
the force of the preemptive provision that favored the residue, § 2-707 
does more than add to the creative slate; indeed, it emasculates what is 
clearly inscribed. 
This is not, however, the only instance in which § 2-707 functions in 
this manner. Indeed, it does essentially the same thing with respect to 
gifts-in-default of the exercise of powers of appointment. Consider this 
testamentary trust created by A: “Income to my brother, B-1, for life; 
thereafter, principal to such of our then living siblings as he appoints by 
his last will, and upon his failure to make a complete or effective 
appointment in favor of living siblings, the principal shall pass to our then 
living siblings absolutely and forever.” Assume that B-1 survives A and 
exercises his testamentary power in favor of his only sisters, S-1 and S-
2—“principal to my sisters absolutely and forever who are alive at my 
death.” Also, assume that S-1 and S-2 predecease B-1, but both leave 
descendants alive at his death. Finally, assume that A’s other siblings—
two brothers, B-2 and B-3—both survive B-1. Who is entitled to share the 
principal upon B-1’s death? 
 84. See id. § 2-707(a)(1). 
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Under the common law paradigm, the answer is clear: it would be B-2 
and B-3. B-1’s appointment does not fully and effectively dispose of the 
principal. The siblings he selects fail to satisfy the requirement of 
survivorship that limits the substance of B-1’s power to appoint and is 
reaffirmed by the appointment itself. Therefore, the appointment fails. 
Absent a giftover, the directions inscribed upon the creative slate would 
have been exhausted, and, consequently, the devise would fail and pass to 
the residue. This failure would not, however, occur because A has 
anticipated this circumstance and provided for an alternative gift—namely, 
the gift-in-default. This gift does not include the living descendants of the 
deceased beneficiaries to whom the appointment was made. Both the 
appointment and the gift-in-default are limited to living members of a 
specified group—A’s siblings. Descendants of siblings are not provided 
for and not even mentioned. Within the group prescribed by the gift-in-
default, there are living members—B-2 and B-3—and, accordingly, they 
become substitute takers by way of explicit provision on their behalf. 
This is not, however, the result reached under § 2-707; indeed, the 
surviving descendants of S-1 and S-2 will take to the exclusion of B-2 and 
B-3. Once again, words of survivorship attached to a gift of a future 
interest to a group are not, without more, enough to overcome the 
automatic statutory substitute gift to living descendants of a deceased 
beneficiary within such group.85 Consequently, the terms of the power and 
the appointment to the sisters that condition principal upon survivorship of 
B-1 will not overcome the automatic statutory substitute gift to the living 
descendants of deceased sisters. Nevertheless, under § 2-707 an express 
alternate future interest is ordinarily deemed sufficient to displace the 
statutory gift to descendants.86 Once again, this gift-in-default should 
preempt the statutory substitute because the event upon which it is 
predicated has occurred: B-1’s appointment to his living sisters has failed 
because neither sister survived him. Nevertheless, § 2-707 determines 
otherwise because it does not permit a gift-in-default to take effect so long 
as there are surviving takers under the appointment who qualify, and these 
takers include those who are specified—the living sisters—and those who 
are not—namely, their living descendants.87 Consequently, once again 
§ 2-707 adds an unexpressed substitute gift to the living descendants of 
deceased sisters in the face of an express giftover to others. Once again, by 
negating the force of the preemptive gift-in-default, § 2-707 does more 
 85. See id. § 2-707(b)(2), (3). 
 86. See id. § 2-707(b)(4). 
 87. See id. § 2-707(b), (c), (e)(1). For further explanation, see Becker, supra note 14, at 386–90. 
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than add unexpressed gifts to the creative slate. Instead, it goes further and 
negates what is clearly inscribed and, presumably, clearly intended. 
Because of § 2-707, the bottom line is that even though one clearly 
expresses what the estate owner means, dispositive language will not 
always mean what it says. Indeed, § 2-707 does more than substitute one 
default construction for another.88 Instead, it substitutes a non-literal 
construction in place of literal meaning based upon affirmative expression 
and not mere silence. Further, it forces such non-literal meaning into a 
particular language format even though, as a draftsman after adoption of 
§ 2-707, one would never use such language format to express the non-
literal meaning required by the statute.89 In doing so, § 2-707 severely 
damages a precept for the expression of any command thought and, 
perhaps, the most important precept for the creation of property interests. 
Essentially, one must always express dispositive commands clearly and 
definitively, thereby avoiding phrases and language formats that are 
incomplete or ambiguous.90 The damage inflicted by § 2-707 is clear. It 
undermines this precept by destroying a format that is clear and 
unambiguous and converting it into something that is hidden or, at least, 
unapparent. 
Once again, two observations stand out. First, § 2-707 imposes radical 
departures from the common law paradigm for the creation of interests. It 
accomplishes this by inventing unexpressed conditions and interests and 
by negating clearly expressed alternative gifts. It begins by altering the 
meaning of silence, and then it goes further and subtracts existing 
 88. For discussion of § 2-707 as a new kind of default construction, see infra Part IV.A. 
 89. For further explanation, see infra notes 123–28 and accompanying text. 
 90. Specific commands and thoughts should never be shrouded by ambiguity. The full range of 
problems and solutions respecting dispositive designs and provisions must be anticipated and resolved 
through directions accomplished with unambiguous language formats.  
The nemesis of the profession in drafting instruments of this type is obscurity, an illegitimate 
relative of the proper instinct for conciseness. No one questions the truism that an idea is best 
expressed in the fewest words; but far too often simplicity of expression is the cloak for 
incompleteness of thought. .... The first task of the draftsman is to foresee, by drawing upon 
his education and experience, the eventualities which may expose the deficiencies in so 
rudimentary an idea, and thus be in a position to develop it into a full-grown plan of 
disposition competent to meet the stress of change. His second task is to express the 
developed thought succinctly in language drawn from a sound knowledge of English speech 
and a familiarity with those many technical expressions to which in a long course of history 
courts have given unexpected meanings. Reduced to a formula: comprehensive and astute 
prevision, concise and accurate provision. 
LEACH & LOGAN, supra note 28, at 237. Unfortunately, there have been hundreds of cases that litigate 
the meaning of short but ambiguous phrases that fail to do the job because of inadequate prevision and 
provision. For example, for a discussion of the checkered history concerning the simple phrase “to B 
and her children,” see SIMES & SMITH, supra note 20, §§ 691–702. 
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additions to the zero-based blank slate. Second, with these changes to the 
paradigm, § 2-707 significantly alters the meaning of unambiguous trusts 
and consequently plays Russian Roulette with an estate owner’s 
dispositive design and the actual intent that underlies it. 
B. The Effect of § 2-707 Upon What Lawyers Must Do When They Plan 
and Draft 
Under the common law paradigm, lawyers have always known that if 
they want to create an interest on behalf of a particular beneficiary, then 
they must clearly express such interest. Further, if they wish to condition 
such gift, then such condition must also be expressed, and so must all 
substitute gifts that are to take effect in the event such condition is not 
satisfied. 
This has been radically changed by § 2-707. The default construction 
no longer amounts to silence equaling nothing in terms of interests and 
conditions; instead silence now includes unexpressed conditions and 
substitute gifts. To be sure, the common law paradigm has been 
profoundly altered. Before going further with a critique of this modified 
paradigm, one should first examine the impact of these changes upon what 
lawyers must do when they plan and draft. If the impact is, as a practical 
matter, nonexistent or negligible, then concern for theoretical changes may 
become of little or no consequence. If, however, the impact is significant, 
one should seriously scrutinize these changes or any others that 
appreciably weaken the theoretical model used for the creation of property 
interests. 
To begin with, one should observe that § 2-707 undoes a significant 
body of law affecting future interests that has evolved over centuries. The 
law is replete with case after case discussion and reliance upon a 
presumption of early vesting. When in doubt, courts will reach a vested 
construction and, almost never, will they find a contingent interest in the 
absence of supportive language or contextual facts.91 Further, if there is an 
express condition, courts have observed again and again that, wherever 
possible, such condition—usually survivorship—will be interpreted as 
referable to the time of creation, namely, the testator’s death in the case of 
a will.92 
 91. For a collection of cases illustrating this presumption and judicial predilection for finding 
vested interests, see LEACH & LOGAN, supra note 28, at 255–315; see also SIMES & SMITH, supra note 
20, § 573; 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 55, § 21.3. 
 92. See, e.g., Ross v. Drake, 37 Pa. St. 373 (1861). See also SIMES & SMITH, supra note 20, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss3/3
p773 Becker book pages.doc11/29/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] ERODING THE COMMON LAW PARADIGM 809 
 
 
 
 
The common law, however, has gone even further in its effort to mute 
the creation of contingent interests and requirements of survivorship. 
Indeed, there are circumstances in which courts have converted a direction 
for distribution upon an inherently uncertain event into an indefeasibly 
vested interest, with payment postponed until the event occurs or would 
have occurred had the beneficiary continued to live.93 For example, courts 
have concluded that a gift “to B at age 30” is a contingent interest, which 
is subject to the requirement that B must actually attain age thirty. If, 
however, the gift had said “to B payable at age 30” or “to B at age 30, with 
income payable to B until B reaches age 30,” the gift would then be 
construed as a vested interest. Having made this construction, courts then 
could only conclude that such interest was indefeasibly vested because of 
the absence of language of divestiture in favor of others if B failed to 
attain age thirty. Given this choice, actual attainment of age thirty was no 
longer a prerequisite to distribution. Instead, courts concluded that it 
merely reflected a time for distribution, without regard to whether B 
survived or failed to survive age thirty. Accordingly, if B attained age 
thirty, distribution would be made to B at that time; if B did not, however, 
distribution would be made to B’s successor, usually his estate, when B 
would otherwise have attained age thirty. 
Whatever one may think of this body of law—including principles that 
seem to blunt express conditions—§ 2-707 clearly repudiates it. A gift to 
“B at age 30”—with or without interim income or the term “payable”—
creates a future interest unless B is already age thirty when such interest is 
created. Because it is a future interest, § 2-707 renders B’s interest subject 
to a requirement of survivorship of the time for distribution—namely, 
when B attains age thirty.94 Further, one should again observe that 
§ 2-707’s requirement of survivorship obtains even when the time for 
distribution is an event that is inherently certain to occur—for example, 
the expiration of a specified period of time—and, therefore, evidences no 
condition of any kind.95 To summarize, the immediate message for all 
lawyers is clear: they must retool their basic understanding of the law of 
 
 
§ 577. 
 93. See SIMES & SMITH, supra note 20, § 586. 
 94. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-707(b) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 194 (1998). 
 95. For example, consider this trust created by A: “Income to B for ten years; upon the expiration 
of ten years principal shall be distributed to B absolutely and forever.” At common law, B’s remainder 
would be indefeasibly vested because the expiration of ten years was not an uncertain event and 
because the language contained no express conditions. The result would, however, be different under 
§ 2-707 because all future interests are automatically subject to conditions of survivorship of the time 
of possession. See id. 
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future interests and all of its nuances because basic precepts and 
refinements have been turned on their head. 
Because of the dramatic changes caused by § 2-707, lawyers must now 
master these changes and then decide how to live with them in light of the 
dispositive instruments they design and draft. The former is, of course, 
fundamental if one is to comprehensively and meticulously implement the 
particular objectives of individual estate owners. Nevertheless, this is not 
an easy task. Section 2-707 is not long, but it is clearly complex. Of 
particular note, it has a tie-breaking subsection that determines which 
group of living descendants will prevail when the beneficiary of a future 
interest and the beneficiary of a gift created in the alternative both die 
before the time for distribution.96 The complexity is caused in part by the 
subsection’s terminology, which in the end cannot be sorted out and 
understood without careful study of the statutory comments and examples 
and, perhaps, resort to explanations within law reviews.97 
There is, however, a more important reason why mastery of § 2-707 is 
not an easy task. In short, its subtleties and nuances are not readily 
anticipated. To be sure, its fundamental requirement of survivorship and 
its substitute gift to surviving descendants are straightforward and clear-
cut. The rest of § 2-707, however, is not. Indeed, the results that obtain 
under much of it are unexpected, often because they seem counter-
intuitive. For example, a gift to members of a class who must expressly 
survive the time for distribution is not enough to circumvent the statutory 
substitute gift to living descendants of a deceased member of the class.98 
Further, the commentary to § 2-707 explains that it is patterned after the 
anti-lapse section within the Uniform Probate Code. That section, 
however, is confined to the preservation of lapsed gifts intended for certain 
members of the estate owner’s family. This reflects expectations that make 
sense within the context of a dispositive scheme confined to family. 
Section 2-707, however, applies to all gifts, and its forced substitute gift to 
living descendants may have no factual basis whatsoever within the 
context of dispositive schemes that do not encompass family.99 
 96. See id. § 2-707(c). 
 97. For full discussion of the complexity of the tiebreaker section, see Becker, supra note 14, at 
354–57. 
 98. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-707(b)(2), (3). 
 99. Section 2-707 of the Uniform Probate Code is intended to project the anti-lapse idea into the 
law of future interests. See id. § 2-707 cmt.; see also Waggoner, supra note 11, at 1210. The anti-lapse 
provision within the Uniform Probate Code is restricted to members of the estate owner’s family. This 
is also true of most state anti-lapse statues. See supra notes 35, 66. However, unlike these anti-lapse 
provisions, § 2-707 is not restricted to family members. The reason for most anti-lapse statutes is clear. 
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Additionally, as previously discussed, substitute gifts created by an 
estate owner may not function under § 2-707 as an alternative future 
interest, even though the estate owner intended it as a preemptory gift.100 
Indeed, a lawyer may quickly discover that § 2-707 permits one to 
preempt the statutory substitute gift to descendants through express 
creation of an alternative future interest. She may, however, not recognize 
that this will work only some of the time, mainly because § 2-707 does not 
recognize gifts-in-default of the exercise of a power of appointment and 
substitute transfers to the residuary takers as statutory alternative future 
interests. Consequently, even when something is expressed in the 
alternative and intended to supersede all else, it may not have that effect 
under § 2-707.  
Finally, whenever a class gift is expressly created for survivors of the 
time of distribution and followed by an alternative future interest in the 
event there are no survivors, the statutory gift to living descendants of a 
deceased member of the class comes into and out of the picture in ways 
that seem to make no sense.101 Under § 2-707, if none of the class 
members survive, then the alternative future interest controls even though 
the deceased class members may have left living descendants. Because 
that is what the limitation literally provided, the statutory substitute gift to 
surviving descendants of deceased class members is superseded. If, 
however, one or more members of the class survive the time of 
distribution along with the descendants of members who failed to survive, 
then the statutory substitute to living descendants prevails and they are 
included.102 Under these circumstances, one might have thought otherwise; 
surely the surviving class members or the beneficiary of the alternative 
future interest should have a higher priority. After all, the primary gift 
seems restricted to the surviving members and in lieu of them there is an 
express giftover. Nevertheless, under § 2-707 mere words of survivorship 
will not preempt the statutory substitute to living descendants, nor will the 
express alternative future interest control because, by its terms, it takes 
effect only upon the failure of all class members to survive. 
In the main, estate owners would not, based upon the time of death of a beneficiary, wish to distort 
their dispositive scheme established primarily for family members, especially if such beneficiary 
leaves surviving descendants who presumably fall within the ambit of the gift that was intended. This 
assumption makes sense with respect to lapsed gifts to family members. It is at best an uneasy 
assumption when applied to others, and for that reason, nearly all anti-lapse statutes place relational 
limits on the lapsed gifts that are to be preserved. 
 100. See supra notes 82–87 and accompanying text. 
 101. For further discussion and explanation, see Becker, supra note 14, at 391–95. 
 102. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-707 ex. 6 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 194 (1998). 
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The bottom line is that sometimes the living descendants are included, 
and sometimes they are not. The problem arises, of course, because the 
estate owner did not expressly provide for them under any circumstance. 
Nevertheless, § 2-707 forcibly includes them, presumably because of a 
belief that this is what the estate owner should have intended had he been 
asked the correct questions. If asked, however, is this actually what the 
estate owner would have wanted? Would the estate owner have wished to 
protect and, therefore, preserve shares for living descendants of deceased 
class members only if one or more class members survived? Would he 
have cast aside his concern for descendants because no class member 
survived? However one might choose to fabricate intent, surely the estate 
owner would not have tied his concern for living descendants of deceased 
class members to the presence or absence of a surviving class member. 
Although this result may be understood in light of § 2-707’s heavy-handed 
attempt to have its way with trusts that are perceived to be deviant, it does 
not have any rational basis in terms of what people probably intend. The 
real danger of this kind of irrationality is misinterpretation, 
misunderstanding, and misapplication of § 2-707, which heighten the cost 
of not achieving full mastery of the statute and not adapting dispositive 
provisions in light of it. 
Once again specific provisions within § 2-707 and the results they 
achieve are counterintuitive, unexpected, and often irrational. More 
generally and importantly, however, § 2-707 will seem counterintuitive to 
all lawyers because it breaches the common law paradigm upon which 
lawyers have been schooled and practiced. The model that lawyers have 
been taught and the one that they use proceeds from a zero-based blank 
slate in which silence equals nothing by way of interests or conditions. 
Section 2-707 breaches this paradigm, however, it does not erase it. The 
common law paradigm still presents the basic methodology for command 
thoughts respecting the creation of property interests, namely, thoughts 
that direct, define, and circumscribe what people receive and enjoy. Yet 
because of § 2-707, the paradigm is now laced with exceptions that erode 
the zero base and, therefore, make it more difficult to master and 
implement with effective dispositive provisions. 
Assuming that lawyers achieve full mastery of § 2-707—and are able 
to retain it103—how will they live with the changes it makes? In short, how 
 103. This is not an easy task. Section 2-707 is intricate, complicated, and often counterintuitive. It 
will tax the memory of even the most talented lawyers. Those who retain it are destined to be only 
those who must reckon with it repeatedly and frequently. The reaction of most lawyers should parallel 
their response to the rule against perpetuities and, therefore, lead them to something resembling saving 
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will § 2-707 affect the way lawyers plan and draft dispositive provisions? 
Will these changes to the common law paradigm seriously impact the 
methodology for drafting that has evolved over centuries in response to the 
paradigm? Proponents of § 2-707 believe that it will have no effect on the 
trusts experienced lawyers draft, and, accordingly, these estate planners 
can and should continue doing exactly what they did beforehand.104 This 
article, however, concludes otherwise.105 Even though one says what one 
means, under § 2-707 it may not mean what it says. 
How should and how will lawyers respond? To begin with, § 2-707 is 
only a rule of construction.106 Presumably, its condition of survivorship 
and substitute gift will yield to a contrary intent. Nevertheless, the 
foregoing discussion quite clearly indicates that a contrary intent 
established by other express conditions of survivorship and alternative 
future interests will not always displace either the statutory condition of 
survivorship of the time for distribution or the statutory substitute gift to 
living descendants. Nevertheless, one can assume that § 2-707 would yield 
completely if the governing instrument established a contrary intent 
through a clear and unequivocal statement that § 2-707 should have no 
control over or effect upon any provision within such instrument. This 
solution may be the most appealing to skilled lawyers, especially those 
whose estate plans and dispositive provisions are meticulously crafted and 
who want to immunize those plans from outside forces designed to rectify 
the mistaken designs of inexperienced lawyers.107 Such practice should 
inevitably lead to the complete emasculation of § 2-707 because over time 
these kinds of boilerplate disclaimers will find their way into published 
forms and soon thereafter into the trusts that all lawyers create. Given this 
practice, the reach of § 2-707 will be nonexistent, and the consequence 
will be almost as if it had never been adopted.108  
Conceivably, this system for avoidance may not obtain. Instead, 
lawyers may choose to design and draft estate plans as if § 2-707 could not 
be removed completely with one comprehensive boilerplate provision. In 
all probability, these lawyers will never rely on § 2-707 to supply either 
conditions of survivorship or substitute gifts to living descendants. Even 
when their dispositive provisions parallel the scheme embraced by 
 
 
clauses, thereby enabling them to ignore § 2-707 completely. See, e.g., infra notes 106–08 and 
accompanying text. 
 104. See Waggoner, supra note 11, at 2349. 
 105. For expanded development of this conclusion, see Becker, supra note 14, at 368–09. 
 106. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-701 (amended 1991), 8 U.L.A. 181 (1998). 
 107. For further discussion, see Becker, supra note 14, at 405–07. 
 108. For further discussion, see id. at 407–09.  
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§ 2-707, they will undoubtedly express all conditions and all gifts, and 
they will do this clearly and comprehensively. Once again, § 2-707 is, 
after all, merely a rule of construction, and they would always want to 
assure the results they desire through positive affirmation rather than rely 
on rules that might be changed or unexpectedly overcome by contextual 
facts.109  
Problems arise, however, when the estate design calls for dispositions 
that deviate from the requirements of § 2-707. Here one really notices the 
changes to the common law paradigm made by § 2-707 and their impact 
upon planning and drafting. The fundamental technique for creating 
command expressions under the common law paradigm has been one of 
positive affirmation. Once again, everything begins with a blank slate and 
the transferor’s interest is not fully divested until the interests and 
conditions expressly superimposed upon the blank slate add up to the full 
measure of the transferor’s estate in the subject matter. In short, one drafts 
by affirmation—addition—and not by negation—subtraction.110 Section 
2-707, however, changes all of this. One must now know precisely when 
to subtract, what to subtract, and how to subtract. Indeed, building a 
disposition by addition alone will not suffice whenever the estate design 
calls for provisions that deviate from § 2-707’s overlay. Affirmation is not 
enough; instead, the limitation must also contain clear expressions of 
negation.  
This can be illustrated. Once again, assume that A wants to leave 
income to B and then, after B’s death, principal to C, but without any 
requirement of survivorship. “Income to B for life; thereafter, principal to 
C absolutely and forever” will not work under § 2-707.111 Instead, one 
must expressly subtract the implied condition of survivorship by saying: 
“(T)hereafter, principal to C absolutely and forever even if C does not 
survive the time for distribution of principal.” Or suppose A wishes to 
leave the principal to B’s children with a requirement of survivorship but 
without a substitute gift to the living descendants of deceased children. 
“Income to B for life; thereafter, principal to B’s then living children 
absolutely and forever” will not work under § 2-707.112 Instead, one must 
expressly subtract the automatic statutory substitute gift by saying: 
“(T)hereafter, principal to B’s then living children absolutely and forever, 
 
 
 109. For further discussion, see id. at 385–86. 
 110. See supra notes 52–64 and accompanying text. 
 111. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-707(b) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 194 (1998). 
 112. See id. § 2-707(b)(3). 
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the share of any deceased child shall belong to the then living children of 
B and not to such deceased child’s living descendants.”  
Further, suppose in the event B has no surviving children, A wants the 
trust principal to pass to C. “Income to B for life; thereafter, principal to 
B’s then living children absolutely and forever, but if none survive then to 
C absolutely and forever” will not accomplish A’s objective. Under 
§ 2-707, the alternative gift to C cuts out the living descendants of B’s 
deceased children if no children survive B but not if one or more children 
survive B.113 Once again, one must subtract through complete negation of 
any statutory substitute gift to living descendants of B’s deceased children. 
Indeed, one must insert: “(T)hereafter, principal to B’s then living children 
absolutely and forever, the share of any deceased child shall belong to the 
then living children of B and not to such deceased child’s living 
descendants, but if none survive B then to C absolutely and forever.”114 
The foregoing illustrations demonstrate the pervasive impact of 
§ 2-707. What one intends and says clearly and definitively may not be the 
meaning established under the law. What was unambiguous under the 
common law paradigm achieves a new meaning that is unapparent and 
non-literal. Despite this new meaning, however, one should observe that 
such transformed language format will never become a creative format 
lawyers use to implement the fabricated statutory meaning. In short, 
§ 2-707 destroys meaning and substitutes a new interpretation—an 
interpretation that is necessarily an uneasy one because the language 
format § 2-707 impacts will never rise to a symbol for positive expression 
of § 2-707’s fabricated meaning.115 
Further, under the common law paradigm one’s main concern was with 
gaps attributable to express conditions and the failure to build alternatives 
that filled these gaps and made the estate owner’s disposition complete.116 
These were, however, self-inflicted problems caused by the dispositive 
design, and they could always be overcome through recognition and 
 
 
 113. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text. 
 114. If the giftover, in the event B leaves no living children, had been directly to the residue and 
not C, then one would have had to subtract the substitute gift to descendants of B’s deceased children 
twice by providing two disclaimers. (For example, one would have to substitute the following 
alternative gift for the one used above in the text: “but if none of B’s children survive B, then to the 
residue absolutely and forever and not to the living descendants of B’s deceased children.”) Because 
the giftover to the residue does not qualify as an alternative future interest under § 2-707, the living 
descendants of B’s children would have taken ahead of the residue even though the language seems to 
preempt completely the primary gift in the event B has no surviving children. See supra notes 82–84 
and accompanying text. 
 115. See infra notes 123–28 and accompanying text. 
 116. See supra notes 58–64 and accompanying text. 
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comprehensive creation by addition. Estate planning under § 2-707, 
however, is changed and has become much more complex. What should 
be clear is that by altering the paradigm and methods for expressing the 
creation of interests—by adding circumstances that call for negation 
beyond affirmation—§ 2-707 lays a trap even for experienced lawyers. Its 
changes transcend subtlety; indeed, they are profound. 
IV. THE CASE FOR MAINTAINING THE COMMON LAW PARADIGM: A 
CRITIQUE AND ARGUMENT 
Section Three has demonstrated how § 2-707 deviates from the 
common law paradigm and its significant impact upon planning and 
drafting. In light of these observations, Section Four states the case for 
maintaining the common law paradigm and rejecting revisions, such as 
§ 2-707, that deviate from it and ultimately complicate the process for 
designing and expressing estate transfers. 
A. Section 2-707 and New Kinds of Default Options for Silence 
Those who support § 2-707, and potentially other law revisions that 
similarly alter the common law paradigm, will begin their defense with 
elaboration of the particular benefits to be achieved by such changes. More 
specifically, they compare the results achieved with particular dispositive 
designs both before and after their revision, and they conclude that nearly 
all estate owners would prefer the revised result.117 And that is reason 
enough to justify their changes to the common law, even if the paradigm 
for creation has been compromised. 
There is, however, another argument to be made in defense of § 2-707 
and any other revision that might alter the common law paradigm, namely, 
an argument that minimizes the significance and impact of an altered 
paradigm. They would observe that one default option has merely replaced 
another. Systems of expression and of law—particularly statutes—almost 
always have default options for things that are unanswered or unclear.118 If 
 117. See Waggoner, supra note 11, at 2310–21. 
 118. For example, in the absence of words of limitation that specifically describe the kind of 
interest expressly created in a transferee, courts will fill the void and find the creation of a particular 
kind of estate. In doing so, they are invariably governed by a statutorily created default construction, 
which in most jurisdictions is no longer, as at common law, the life estate but is instead the fee simple. 
See supra notes 17, 55; see also UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 1.401(g) 
(amended 1972), 7B U.L.A. 549 (2000) (which, in the absence of expressed agreement, fixes a basis 
for determining rent, where and when such rent is to be paid, and the kind of tenancy that arises). 
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A creates a trust with “income to B for life and principal thereafter to C 
absolutely and forever,” the limitation is silent as to precedent conditions 
involving A’s distribution of principal, other than the obvious requirement 
that B must die. Under the common law paradigm the default option for 
silence is nothing, meaning there is no precedent condition. Therefore, C’s 
successors can assume possession even if C does not survive B. Further, if 
one were to supply a precedent condition of survivorship that C did not 
satisfy and there were no expressed substitute gift—and, consequently, 
silence as to the existence of one—the common law paradigm’s default 
option would again control. Such silence would amount to nothing—that 
is, no substitute gift—and, accordingly, the gift of principal following B’s 
death would fail. The default option for a failed gift of principal would 
then become operative. Again, it is a form of nothing. Any transfer from A 
that is less than the interest A owns constitutes an incomplete divestiture 
and leaves A with a reversion. Therefore, upon B’s death, the principal in 
a sense goes nowhere. Instead, it remains exactly where it has been all 
along—with A. Consequently, the principal will revert to A upon the death 
of B in the event C predeceases B. 
Continuing the argument, what § 2-707 really does, then, is merely to 
change the default option for certain kinds of gifts. As to all future 
interests created in trust, silence no longer equals nothing. It no longer 
means no condition and no substitute gift. The default option for total 
silence—that is, no conditions at all—is a condition of survivorship of the 
time for distribution and a substitute gift to the then living descendants of 
the owner of the future interest in the event she fails to survive. Further, if 
there is an express requirement of survivorship that does not relate to the 
time for distribution, the same default option applies; namely § 2-707 adds 
an additional requirement of survivorship along with a substitute gift to 
living descendants. Finally, if there is an express requirement of 
survivorship tied directly to the time for distribution, but silence 
concerning a substitute gift, the default option under § 2-707 produces a 
substitute gift to living descendants. Accordingly, these are the default 
options for silence within the context of future interests created pursuant to 
a trust.119 Silence no longer means nothing under § 2-707; instead, it 
means something—indeed, something very significant. 
This argument—one that reduces the impact of § 2-707 to a mere 
change in default options—seems to assume that default options are 
fungible, namely, that one is as good as the other, and that it does not 
 119. See supra notes 65–76 and accompanying text. 
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really matter which option is adopted so long as some option is selected. 
To be sure, this assumption is ill founded. Default options are not fungible. 
Some present problems and complexities that others do not. And some 
achieve important goals that others do not. In short, the default system that 
accompanies the creation of property interests under § 2-707 creates a 
paradigm that is more complex and confusing. And the policy reasons that 
underlie § 2-707 do not justify the infusion of such complexity and 
confusion, especially when there are other ways to prevent and overcome 
poorly designed estate plans. 
B. Problems Generated by Mixed-Bag Default Options 
To begin with, one should observe that, after adoption of § 2-707, the 
core of the new paradigm is still a zero-based system in which one begins 
creation of interests from a blank slate and the default option for silence 
remains nothing. After all, § 2-707 is only concerned with future interests 
that are created pursuant to a trust.120 Consequently, the common law 
paradigm is still intact with respect to transfers that do not involve a trust. 
But even when a trust is used, the default option in most instances is still 
nothing, and one will still create interests by addition and cumulation until 
the transferor’s interests have been fully exhausted. For example, if A uses 
a trust to create successive income interests in B for life and C for life, but 
does not thereafter dispose of the principal, the gift would be incomplete 
assuming A held an absolute interest. Silence would constitute nothing and 
the subject matter would revert back to A or A’s estate. Further, if A had 
made C the beneficiary of the principal and had conditioned such gift upon 
C’s graduation from college prior to the termination of B’s life estate, C’s 
gift would fail and revert back to A’s estate assuming, for example, that C 
had survived B but not yet graduated from college. The existence of living 
descendants in C would be irrelevant because § 2-707 only creates a 
substitute gift to descendants in the event the requirement of survivorship 
of the time of distribution is not met. Consequently, the statute becomes 
inapplicable, and the common law paradigm controls. Once the gift of 
 120. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-707 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 194 (1998). In some ways the 
limited scope of § 2-707 is a surprise. The section is intended to overcome and rewrite poorly drafted 
dispositive provisions. Therefore, one might have thought that the statutory focus ought to be 
instruments of transfer that do not utilize trusts, such as deeds and even simple wills, because they are 
often prepared without benefit of adequate counsel or any counsel at all. Trusts, however, almost 
always reflect the work of lawyers. Consequently, the occasion for mistake, oversight, and 
incompetence ought to be greater in the first instance than in the latter and, therefore, surely should 
demand the attention of such law reform. 
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principal to C fails, there is no substitute disposition of principal, and, as a 
result, one is left with silence. Silence means nothing by way of further 
transfer; therefore, the disposition of principal is incomplete and must 
revert.  
Consequently, reforms like § 2-707 leave one with a mixed bag in 
terms of default options. Most of the time, silence means nothing, but 
some of the time, it translates into something very significant. Because of 
this, those who execute these instruments of transfer and those who benefit 
from them—and even those who must interpret and implement the 
dispositive commands within them—will have a more difficult time 
understanding them and reconciling the results they yield. The 
predominant system for communicating the dispositive message is still the 
blank slate. Silence must be breached by clear exposition of gifts. 
Experienced lawyers will never rely upon silence to signify something 
beyond nothing, even when they intend to employ the conditions and gifts 
that underscore a default option derived from silence. Instead, experienced 
lawyers will clearly and fully elaborate them. And when the limitations 
they create contain silence, they intend to create nothing even though a 
new default option may impose something. When this happens, those who 
read these provisions may inevitably puzzle—or worse litigate—over gifts 
and conditions that evolve from pure silence and, therefore, seem to come 
out of nowhere. Though the creation and interpretation of these 
instruments are ultimately in the hands of professionals, a system of 
expression that makes no sense to the very people who use it or benefit 
from it is destined to create problems and much displeasure.121 Ideally, 
dispositive instruments should be readable and understandable by all, and 
 121. One should note that the system for command expression used with respect to commonplace 
daily activities often employs a blank slate in which silence means nothing, where directions are added 
and cumulated and, therefore, resemble the common law paradigm for creation of property interests. 
Consider, for example, the way one creates and expresses a “shopping list” for someone else to carry 
out. See infra note 157. Indeed, there is a common sense appeal to this kind of paradigm and it is 
something people come to understand and employ. 
 Also one should add that lawyers are often criticized because they do not draft documents that are 
understandable by the very people who must sign them and, therefore, should surely comprehend 
them. Often instruments governing the transfer of property interests are shrouded with mystery, 
sometimes because of terms and concepts that derive from history. This is not desirable and most legal 
educators recognize this. Consequently, the emphasis of much instruction on legal writing is on 
conciseness and clarity. So just imagine the reaction of a family when they are told unexpressed gifts 
exist and undercut the “clear meaning” of the dispositive instrument that governs their family 
inheritance. Indeed, they may ask when a gift is left to surviving siblings: “Why are my brother’s 
descendants entitled to take? Where does the trust even mention his descendants? How can this be?” 
Surely, neither the lawyer nor the system looks very good under these kinds of circumstances. 
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the law neither looks good nor functions well when it moves in other 
directions. 
The mixed bag also presents problems for lawyers who plan and draft 
dispositive instruments. At least two kinds of problems compound the 
complexity of the process. First, there is difficulty caused by the mere 
presence of a default option that produces something from nothing—
something substantial that is derived from mere silence. A system in 
which silence means nothing, and where the transfer of interests to others 
begins with a blank slate, is easy to grasp, retain, and implement. Clear 
and complete expression of all gifts and conditions is mandatory. Failure 
to explicate will almost always nullify an intended gift or condition. One 
begins the creative process with a landscape that has few limits, thereby 
giving the estate owner significant freedom to chart out a highly personal 
dispositive design. Implementation of that design requires one to fill in the 
landscape in great detail. And one knows that every intended feature must 
always appear in that landscape, or else it will not exist. However, once 
the system becomes a hybrid, which may require subtraction of 
unexpressed statutorily created conditions and gifts triggered by special 
design configurations, the process of transfer and creation becomes more 
complex.122 To begin with, one must master the substance and nuances of 
the new default option because they may not be simple or obvious. The 
stakes are high because the new default option, as in the case of § 2-707, 
may not be grounded in anything connected to express language or even 
apparent intent, and it may yield a result that actually frustrates the 
dispositive design. One must learn that silence does not equal nothing 
under certain circumstances, and, further, one must never overlook those 
circumstances or what the new default option produces once they arise. 
This leads to a second problem that compounds complexity, one that 
concerns difficulties in varying or aborting the statutory overlay imposed 
by silence. Before examining this second problem, one must first 
 122. For discussion of these complexities, see supra Part III.B. One should note, however, that 
there are instances in which a system of mixed-bag directions is required, does not involve great 
complexity or cost, and functions well. For example, consider the simple act of ordering a hamburger 
from your local McDonald’s. By default, the hamburger includes ketchup, mustard, pickle slices, and 
onions, see McDonald’s, www.mcdonalds.com (last visited Aug. 24, 2005)—items considered to be 
desirable by most customers. However, not everyone prefers onions. Some may prefer extra mustard 
instead. In order to achieve the desired result, a customer must first request no onions, and then request 
extra mustard. In other words, the customer creates their “ideal” hamburger by addition (selection of 
the hamburger itself), subtraction, and then addition. This type of mixed-bag system works well 
because it is simple and intuitive; the customer and vendor interact directly and in person, with a 
tangible result. Any problems with the hamburger are easily corrected, and the risk for error is low. A 
new hamburger can be made in seconds, at a low cost. 
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understand how lawyers are apt to draft in light of new dispositive 
overlays engendered by silence. Given the fact that the core of the system 
for creating interests still rests upon the common law paradigm, one 
cannot expect that the new default option will ever be used as a positive 
method for achieving the result it imposes. More specifically, one should 
not expect lawyers to rely upon silence to produce the dispositive design 
embraced by § 2-707. Indeed, the authors of § 2-707 fully expected skilled 
estate planners to continue drafting just as they had before its enactment, 
namely, to use language that elaborated the very consequences that 
§ 2-707 was intended to yield.123 There are at least three reasons why their 
prediction makes sense and why silence will not replace expression as the 
principal technique for delineation of § 2-707’s conditions of survivorship 
and substitute gifts.  
First, the new default option is only a rule of construction and not a 
rule of property.124 As such it can always be overcome by language and 
context that clearly indicates a different intent and, therefore, disposition. 
If an estate owner clearly opts for a condition of survivorship and a 
substitute gift to surviving descendants, then her lawyer must make these 
requirements unmistakable. One must always safeguard against 
unforeseen misinterpretation, and full reliance upon a default option that 
functions only as a rule of construction is not an adequate safeguard. An 
estate planner should always view her margin of error as zero. Because a 
rule of construction always allows for something different, its margin for 
error is much too great. The only way to assure conditions and the 
substitute gifts they require, and thereby crystallize and evidence actual 
intent, is to express them fully. 
Second, this judgment to explicate all conditions and gifts is consistent 
with the literature on drafting.125 Much has been written about the 
importance of clear intent, the use of literal expression, and the avoidance 
 123. Waggoner, supra note 11, at 2349. 
 124. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-701 (amended 1991), 8 U.L.A. 181 (1998). 
 125. See, e.g., WILLIAM SCHWARTZ, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLANNING 270 (Student ed. 
1965). 
If a condition of survivorship is to be imposed, it should be carefully drafted. The instrument 
should explicitly state the time to which survivorship is required. It should also explicitly 
state whether (and to what time) survivorship is required for both primary and alternative 
takers. It should also explicitly state the circumstances for the application of the survivorship 
requirement and the effect of failing to survive under all conditions and under some but not 
all circumstances. In addition, it should also specify what disposition is to be made of the 
property in the event there is a failure to survive. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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of ambiguous terms and phrases.126 Such literature is not confined to the 
creation of property interests and, therefore, to things that rest upon the 
common law paradigm. Whether one is concerned with property interests, 
contracts, or legislation, clarity has always been emphasized as an absolute 
essential for drafting. Such clarity invariably requires literal expression 
that calls for language that fully and unambiguously elaborates the ideas 
and requirements of the legal commands that flow from such documents. 
If a command embraces an idea that leads to a single result, then the 
language must compel a meaning that leads nowhere else. Phrases and 
words with more than one meaning must, therefore, be avoided, and so 
must silence when its meaning has only the force of a rule of construction. 
Instead, the meaning that underscores silence should be confirmed by 
language that overtly erases the potential for ambiguity. 
There is a third reason why lawyers will not rely upon § 2-707 and, 
therefore, silence for the inclusion of § 2-707’s conditions and gifts. Very 
often lawyers will either want to vary these conditions and substitute gifts 
or expand upon them. For example, as to gifts of principal, estate owners 
frequently want to include additional requirements beyond survivorship of 
the prior income interests. This might include tying distribution to 
particular ages. Sometimes these requirements might involve survivorship 
of a designated age,127 but at other times they may not. Instead of 
survivorship, all that may be intended is deferral of distribution until the 
age is actually attained or would have been attained.128 Further, when 
conditions are included, an estate owner may wish to deviate from the 
substitute gift imposed by § 2-707. Surviving descendants of a deceased 
beneficiary may not be intended at all. Highest priority may be given to 
other surviving members when a class gift is created. Or, if not a class gift, 
the preferred alternative may be a residuary gift to charities. Indeed, 
sophisticated estate planning will often call for more conditions or 
 126. See, e.g., REED DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING 12–13, 73–97 
(1965). 
 127. See, e.g., ROBERT P. WILKINS, 2 DRAFTING WILLS & TRUST AGREEMENTS §§ W.11.60–
W.11.62, W.11.70, W.11.74 (Michael L.M. Jordan ed., 3d ed. 2002). These provisions stagger 
distribution of the principal to beneficiaries upon attainment of multiple ages. For beneficiaries who do 
not survive one or more of these age requirements, principal is redirected, sometimes immediately per 
stirpes to the deceased beneficiary’s then living issue, and sometimes to them after default in the 
exercise of a special power of appointment given to the deceased beneficiary.  
 128. See id. §§ W.13.70–W.13.71. These provisions authorize a trustee or executor to act as 
trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary otherwise entitled to distribution of principal before attaining 
age twenty-one. Although the trustee thereby controls distribution of income and principal before such 
beneficiary attains twenty-one, this provision requires payment of all remaining principal to the 
beneficiary upon attaining age twenty-one or to the beneficiary’s executor or administrator if such 
beneficiary dies before then. 
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different substitute gifts. In either case, experienced lawyers will fully 
express and elaborate all terms, conditions, and gifts that reflect the estate 
design, including those that deviate from the statutory overlay. 
Given the fact, then, that lawyers will not rely upon silent statutory 
conditions and gifts, but will always choose to express them, planners and 
drafters must confront a second kind of complexity. More specifically, 
they must not only know the contents of the new default option, they must 
also know whether such silent overlay will affect or circumscribe in any 
way their explication of their estate owner’s complete dispositive design. 
Stated otherwise, they must know when and how to subtract the contents 
of the default option and circumvent the overlay it imposes, and they must 
also know how to replace the overlay with the precise terms, conditions, 
and gifts of their clients. This would be an uncomplicated task if the 
default option could be erased with any expression that addressed the 
silence differently. In a sense, this is exactly how intestate statutes of 
descent and distribution function. Except with respect to protection offered 
to a surviving spouse, intestacy statutes are erased by any will that fully 
disposes of a testator’s estate. One gift of everything does it all.129  
This, however, is not how § 2-707 operates, and, as indicated 
previously, it is not an easy matter to eradicate its statutory overlay.130 For 
example, express conditions of survivorship imposed upon a class will not 
eliminate the substitute gift to living descendants of a deceased beneficiary 
who otherwise would have been a member of the class. Additionally, an 
alternative gift directly and immediately to the residue will not be enough 
to circumvent the statutory substitute to living descendants of a deceased 
beneficiary. A disposition different from the substance of the overlay is 
not necessarily enough to overcome it. Instead one must expressly subtract 
all undesired features in a manner permitted by § 2-707, and the technique 
for accomplishing this may not be obvious. Or one must negate § 2-707 
and remove it from the trust entirely. Either way, the task is not easy. 
Consequently, § 2-707, or any other default option arising from silence, 
can become a disaster waiting to happen, especially for experienced and 
skilled professionals—a group that was never intended to be affected by 
§ 2-707. 
 129. Absent a surviving spouse or certain descendants which one must mention at least by way of 
exclusion, a will that disposes of a decedent’s entire estate will erase the potential claims of heirs at 
law who would otherwise take through the statute of descent and distribution. Indeed, a simple devise 
of “all of the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate to B absolutely and forever” is all that it would 
take to negate the statutory overlay that functions in the absence of a will that effectively disposes of 
one’s entire estate. 
 130. See supra Part III.B. 
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The foregoing discussion has been quite specific to § 2-707. Once 
again, the problems and complexities involved in bypassing its statutory 
overlay would be averted if one could more readily escape its impact; for 
example, a system of negation in which every disposition that addressed 
any aspect of the silence upon which the default option was predicated 
would immediately and entirely suspend the statutory overlay. 
Nevertheless, such a system would not eliminate the basic complexity 
caused by a mixed bag of default options. If the core of the paradigm is 
still a blank slate in which the meaning of silence is nothing, then those 
involved in the creation and transfer of interests will be accustomed to 
exactly that. The blank slate with which they commence must be altered 
by the addition of interests. The end product of conditions and gifts is 
reached by the cumulation of things expressly mentioned and thereby 
added together to comprise a complete transfer. The paradigm’s 
conclusion when silence occurs is quite simple: nothing is added to the 
equation. Statutory changes that alter the paradigm by making something 
out of nothing, especially those that substitute complex conditions and 
gifts for silence, add considerable complexity and inevitably heighten the 
occasions for oversight and mistake. One must always reckon with the 
silent something—when to look for it, what it is, how it affects the estate 
design, and finally how to overcome it. Complexity is inevitable when the 
need for subtraction is introduced into a system built upon creation by 
addition. Section 2-707 is a major departure from the common law 
paradigm, but it may not become the only one. There may be others that 
add new kinds of default options—new content to silence that occurs 
within other contexts. Each time this happens, new complexities should 
arise and so will occasions for oversight as to the recognition and 
subtraction of these different kinds of statutory overlays. 
C. Critiquing an Entirely New Kind of Paradigm Where Silence Always 
Means Something 
The critique, thus far, has assumed a fundamental system for creation 
in which dispositions are built by addition and the default option for 
silence amounts to nothing in terms of conditions or gifts. Although 
§ 2-707 does not abrogate the core of the existing common law 
paradigm—nor is there any evidence that law reformers will attempt this 
in the future—one should observe that it would be possible to have an 
entire system that functioned quite differently, namely, one in which the 
transfer of interests does not begin with a blank slate. Instead, every 
dispositive act, especially those that were donative, would begin with 
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creation of preordained interests. For example, if one had only a spouse, 
one might begin with a preordained transfer of everything to such spouse 
absolutely even when the document was silent both as to the donee and the 
kind of interest the donee was to receive. Or if one had a spouse and 
children, one might begin with a preordained trust with an income interest 
to the spouse for life and the principal to such children. Such a system 
might include conditions concerning the gift of principal and an array of 
substitute gifts. The conditions could include requirements of survivorship 
of the time for distribution, attainment of specific ages, and anything else 
one might view as a desirable norm. In the end, for every family 
constellation, the estate owner and her lawyer would confront an elaborate 
dispositive overlay that established preordained gifts and conditions. 
Enactment by an estate owner—e.g., with a spouse and children—of a 
dispositive overlay would be quite simple. It could be accomplished, for 
example, by merely executing and funding a living trust. Without more, 
the overlay would exist. Silence as to the terms of disposition would not 
amount to nothing; instead, it would automatically invoke the appropriate 
overlay. Under these circumstances, dispositive choices would not exist. 
An estate owner could either opt for the preordained overlay by will or 
through a living trust or allow her estate to pass by intestacy, which might 
reenact the same overlay or a different one. 
As described, this overlay would be inflexible and, thereby, fully 
preempt dispositive choice. Alternatively, the overlay could present 
limited choices. For example, it could offer a limited spectrum of gifts and 
conditions that were legally permissible. The paradigm for exercising 
personal choice would then become a process in which one created by 
subtraction or check-off. To be sure, the overlay might offer alternative 
models from which one could choose a preferred dispositive scheme that 
constituted a complete transfer unto itself. Further, there might be limited 
options within each model—for example, the option to select the age or 
ages upon which distribution of principal was conditioned. And in every 
instance, these models and the options within them would be prioritized. 
Accordingly, silence or a failure to subtract would default to the remaining 
model and the options with the highest priority. Individual preference 
would be expressed through elimination of unwanted models and 
unwanted conditions and gifts within the model that was retained. At the 
core of the planning and drafting process would be the subtraction of 
rejected dispositive models and of particular features of the preferred 
dispositive model until the remaining structure reflected an estate owner’s 
personal design. Once again, failure to subtract would automatically 
default to the model and options with the highest priority. 
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Without modification, such a system would not be superior to the 
common law paradigm. Personal choice would be limited to subtraction of 
particular dispositive models and the features within them, but it would 
not include substitution of unique kinds of gifts crafted by estate owners. 
On its face the complexity of such a default system would seem enormous 
because of the elaborate overlays it created for each family constellation. 
Nevertheless, official forms could be created for each family constellation, 
and these forms would display all models and the options within them.131 
Individual estate owner refinement of each design would then consist of 
creation by deletion, namely, the elimination of unwanted alternative 
models or options. Mistakes could still occur. Incomplete gifts could result 
whenever too much was subtracted. But this risk may not be greater than 
the risk of an incomplete gift under the common law paradigm whenever 
too little is added. Under the common law, an incomplete gift would result 
from some form of silence that could potentially yield a reversion and 
intestacy. However, under this system, an incomplete gift would default to 
the remaining option or model with the highest priority. 
There would, nevertheless, be a transcendent problem that involves a 
basic reduction in dispositive freedom. To be sure, under the common law 
paradigm one cannot create new kinds of interests previously unknown 
and unrecognized by the law.132 Nor can one infuse requirements and 
conditions deemed illegal or contrary to public policy.133 Beyond these 
relatively unrestricted parameters, one has great freedom to design and 
shape a dispositive design, limited only by one’s own imagination. 
Consequently, if one were to convert to a system in which all permissible 
options had to be enumerated as part of its overlay, estate owner choice 
would immediately become finite. Accordingly, personal freedom would 
be compressed unless the overlay were to proliferate options almost ad 
infinitum. Such extensive proliferation would ultimately yield a work 
product that was cumbersome if not unwieldily. Either way, there would 
be a cost.  
If, however, the system were made more flexible by truly honoring 
personal choice, it would still require a positive system for creation once 
portions of or all of the default scheme had been erased. Undoubtedly, 
 131. This would, of course, resemble in some ways basic forms available today and what lawyers 
do with them. There is, however, an important difference. Lawyers can discard forms completely, or 
provisions within them, and substitute dispositive designs of their own which are crafted to meet the 
objectives of individual estate owners. 
 132. See supra note 51. 
 133. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text. 
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once all or a portion of the extensive preexisting overlay had been 
removed, the positive system would resemble the one embraced by the 
common law paradigm in which creation is by addition. This seems 
inevitable so long as ownership is still defined in terms of estates 
measured over time and possessory and nonpossessory estates are 
sanctioned.134 One begins with the unit owned by the estate owner, and, 
for a complete transfer to occur, all possessory and nonpossessory interests 
must add up to the whole that belonged to the transferor. Once one vacates 
a portion or all of the statutory overlay, one must rebuild, and this requires 
one to use the calculus upon which the estate system has evolved. For 
example, if the statutory overlay called for a transfer of the full estate to 
the surviving spouse in fee simple absolute, then if one were to opt for 
something different by using multiple income interests, the sum of the 
gifts must still add up to complete disposition of the estate. And this could 
only be accomplished with an end gift of the principal that was the 
equivalent of a fee simple absolute. 
Although creation by addition would seem unavoidable under these 
circumstances, the default option for silence might not be fully restored to 
nothing. If the new overlay created by statute could be readily erased, 
partly or completely, then the statutory default system would no longer 
apply to silence and a different default would be needed to replace it. 
Presumably, the default option for silence would revert to nothing—no 
conditions and no substitute gifts—at least as to the portions of the overlay 
that had been removed. Nevertheless, the new system might not permit 
one to erase fully the overlay. Instead, it could require one to continue 
subtracting undesired conditions and substitute gifts throughout the 
process of rebuilding estate units by addition. Indeed, silence would still 
translate into something. As a practical matter, this would require either 
the expression or negation of conditions and substitute gifts upon the 
creation of each future interest. For example, suppose the default system 
called for a fee simple absolute in a surviving spouse, but the estate owner 
elected to create an income interest in the spouse with the principal to their 
children absolutely. The statutory overlay might still superimpose 
conditions of survivorship and substitute gifts to living descendants in the 
rebuilt gift that replaces the one otherwise given absolutely to the spouse. 
If the estate owner did not want such conditions or substitute gifts, then 
express subtraction would be required. Further, if the estate owner wanted 
 134. For a summary discussion of the estate concept, see NELSON, STOEBUCK, & WHITMAN, 
supra note 16, at 219–24.  
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these aspects of the overlay or wished to add other requirements, then 
surely they would be expressed in full. Creation of new interests under 
these circumstances would then require both subtraction and addition. 
One thing seems clear: if dispositive freedom as we have known it is to 
be preserved, a paradigm for creation based exclusively upon subtraction 
would not be viable. A system that makes “something” the equivalent of 
silence all of the time will not work adequately so long as personal choice 
remains an important value. Consequently, a mixed-bag system for 
creation of interests—in which silence sometimes means something and 
sometimes means nothing—seems inevitable once law reform permits the 
integrity of the common law paradigm to be compromised. And with a 
mixed bag, one could expect the same kinds of difficulties now 
encountered under § 2-707.135 At the very least, lawyers must become 
fully versed in the new overlay and whatever was required to avert it and 
enable them to implement a new design. This could become very 
complicated. The level of complexity would depend upon the 
requirements for escaping the overlay and the controls imposed upon the 
process for rebuilding a different dispositive scheme. At the very least, the 
complexity generated by such a system should rival the problems caused 
by the mixed-bag paradigm created by § 2-707 and, therefore, so should 
the occasions for oversight and disaster as to objectives and results sought 
by the estate owner. One thing is for sure: this mixed bag would be far 
more difficult to master than the common law paradigm. 
D. Benefits and Costs of Altering the Meaning of Silence—The Argument 
for Rejecting § 2-707 and Changes to the Common Law Paradigm 
Despite these complexities, one might justify a system of mixed-bag 
default options if the benefits it achieved were significant. Conceivably, a 
system’s benefits might outweigh its complexities and dangers. It is, 
however, difficult to make a comparative analysis based upon default 
options that have yet to be conceived which transform silence into 
“something” instead of “nothing.” Section 2-707 does, however, exist; 
consequently, one can begin with a comparative analysis concerning it 
and, therefore, an examination of the reasons for § 2-707 and the 
objectives and benefits it is intended to achieve.  
To begin with, one should note generally objectives that do not 
underscore § 2-707. For example, it does not serve the kinds of public 
 135. For discussion of these difficulties, see supra Part IV.B. 
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policies that frequently explain many decisions, rules, and statutes 
affecting the law of property. It is not concerned with preserving 
alienability, preventing fraud, achieving a supply of habitable rental 
housing, the pursuit of certainty, or assuring the legitimacy of an act of 
transfer.136 Nor is it concerned with assuring dispositive accuracy and the 
clarification of ambiguous or incomplete expression required to discover 
true intent.137 These reflect important societal values that have justified 
many rules which have gained acceptance despite the private costs they 
frequently impose. If any of these traditional values supported § 2-707 or 
potentially new and different default options, the analysis might be 
different, and so might one’s ultimate conclusion. 
Section § 2-707 is, however, different. It is grounded upon assumptions 
concerning preferred dispositive choices and what is needed to assure 
correct implementation of such choices. Section 2-707 is intended to 
rewrite certain trusts because of a strong belief that the estate owner was 
never asked the right questions and, therefore, never given the right 
dispositive choices.138 Section 2-707 rests upon two basic assumptions.139 
First, estate owners always wish to conserve death costs that can diminish 
the size of their estate, and this includes death costs associated with not 
only their death, but also those associated with the death of their 
beneficiaries.140 Second, estate owners much prefer to keep their estate 
 136. Section 2-707 is not concerned with matters of alienability as are the common law rule 
against perpetuities and the doctrine forbidding direct restraints upon the fee simple. Unlike many 
recording acts, it is not concerned with the prevention of fraud. It is not concerned with achieving a 
supply of habitable rental housing as are housing codes and the implied warranty of habitability. 
Additionally, § 2-707 is not concerned with the pursuit of certainty and consistency as is the doctrine 
of stare decisis. Nor is § 2-707 intended to assure the legitimacy of donative transfers of property as 
does the statute of frauds. 
 137. Section 2-707 does not focus on words—such as “descendants”—or phrases—such as “die 
without issue”—that can be patently ambiguous or become ambiguous as a result of the language and 
factual context in which they are used. Further, § 2-707 does not focus on incomplete expressions that 
often suggest an estate owner design that is not fully established. For example, consider these two 
residuary testamentary trusts: (1) “Income to B for life, and then principal to C absolutely if B dies 
without children alive at her death”; (2) “Income to B for life, and then if C survives B, principal to C 
absolutely; however, if C dies before B without leaving children alive at B’s death, then principal to D 
absolutely.” Assume in the first illustration that B is survived by children and in the second that C 
predeceases B but leaves surviving children. A strict application of the common law paradigm, in 
which silence amounts to nothing, will cause the remainders to fail, an incomplete disposition of the 
estate owner’s estate, and an intestacy. Some courts, therefore, might reach this construction and 
conclusion. Others, however, might find insight and ultimate direction in the conditions that mention 
children and, consequently, find by implication a substitute gift to surviving children even though the 
language failed to expressly define such gift. 
 138. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 139. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 140. With respect to estate conservation upon the deaths of beneficiaries, consider this residuary 
trust created by A: “Income to my husband, H, for life; upon the death of H, principal to my two 
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within the families of their beneficiaries, and this means essentially 
descendants of beneficiaries.141 This desire to control estate devolution is 
especially strong whenever a beneficiary is unable to survive the time for 
enjoyment and thereby personally benefit from the estate owner’s gift. 
Consequently, estate owners wish to substitute their judgment and control 
over the destiny of their estate whenever beneficiaries predecease the time 
for distribution. Instead of risking diversion of the estate to spouses or 
others through a beneficiary’s will, estate owners prefer to substitute their 
judgment by making a direct gift to a deceased beneficiary’s living 
descendants. Consequently, based upon these assumptions, § 2-707 
rewrites trusts by including requirements of survivorship for beneficiaries 
of future interests and by adding substitute gifts to living descendants for 
those beneficiaries that do not survive. Unless a trust expressly negates 
these choices, § 2-707 proceeds from the assumption that all estate owners 
share the same goals and, as a result, want the same conditions of 
children, B and C, absolutely and forever.” As written, B’s and C’s remainders are vested and, 
therefore, transmissible at death if either were to predecease the time for distribution of principal, 
namely, at H’s death. All transmissible interests, whether possessory or nonpossessory, become a part 
of a decedent’s estate and are, depending upon the size of the estate, subject to estate tax. 
Consequently, if B predeceased H and left his share of the principal to a living descendant, B-1, such 
remainder would continue within the family consistent with the expectations of most estate owners. It 
would, however, be diminished by any estate taxes at the death of B that were incurred as a result of 
including B’s remainder within B’s taxable estate. This tax, however, could have been avoided through 
a condition of survivorship, by making B’s interest non-transmissible at death and removing it from 
his estate. And by adding a substitute gift to B’s living descendants, A could have directly provided for 
B-1 just the same as B had in the original example. This is exactly what § 2-707 accomplishes. It 
produces estate conservation among beneficiaries through requirements of survivorship and substitute 
gifts and thus better preserves the original estate devised by A. Section 2-707 is designed to 
accomplish this because of underlying assumptions made about what estate owners really desire and, 
therefore, must intend. 
 There is, however, some evidence that traditional priorities among estate owners are changing and 
that this shift in objectives could alter the landscape of estate planning. In short, concern for taxes and 
estate conservation and protection are being eclipsed by a concern for preservation of the family and 
the values that underlie it. Because of the comparatively recent explosion of individual wealth within 
this country, the decline of estate taxes, and the presence of other factors, some commentators observe 
that estate owners are now focusing on the effect of too much wealth. To be sure, estate owners still 
want to minimize intra-family strife and protect their families from ever being destitute, but they also 
want to provide incentives and opportunities for family members. Most importantly, they do not want 
to provide an unearned and non-working lifestyle that blunts ambition and depreciates self-worth. See, 
e.g., John J. Scroggins, Protecting and Preserving The Family—The True Goal of Estate Planning, 
Part I: Reasons and Philosophy, 16 PROB. & PROP. No. 3, 29 (2002); John J. Scroggins, Protecting 
and Preserving the Family: The True Goal of Estate Planning, Part II—Some of the Tools, 16 PROB. 
& PROP. No. 4, 34 (2002). 
 141. In light of this assumption, § 2-707 includes a substitute gift to the living descendants of a 
beneficiary of a future interest who fails to satisfy an expressed or statutory requirement of 
survivorship of the time for distribution. For further discussion of this assumption, see Halbach & 
Waggoner, supra note 11, at 1133. 
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survivorship and substitute gifts. Therefore, § 2-707 superimposes a 
template that standardizes all future interests created through trusts. 
Proponents of § 2-707 argue that lawyers experienced in estate 
planning ask the right questions that elicit the foregoing responses and 
dispositive choices, and, accordingly, they then include conditions of 
survivorship and substitute gifts to living descendants.142 Inexperienced 
lawyers do not, however, ask these questions and, therefore, do not include 
these provisions. Consequently, the trusts they draft are flawed and may 
even constitute malpractice. Section 2-707 saves estate owners, 
beneficiaries, and the public from bad trusts, and it spares lawyers from 
costly litigation and adverse judgments. It overcomes bad trusts by 
rewriting them so that principal is ultimately delivered to those 
beneficiaries who were really intended to receive it if the estate owner had 
only been asked the right questions. Consequently, these are the benefits 
that derive from § 2-707 and the new paradigm it generates for creation of 
interests, one that includes a mixed bag of default options. And these are 
the benefits that must justify costs incurred by § 2-707’s paradigm. 
These costs are multiple. Once again, there are the foregoing costs 
endemic to a system that alters the meaning of silence and leaves one with 
a mixed bag that calls for both addition and subtraction in the formation 
and implementation of an estate design.143 These costs derive from 
problems associated with non-literal meaning, increased complexity, and 
the resulting predilection for oversight and mistake. But there are also 
added costs peculiar to § 2-707 that derive mainly from problems 
associated with the subtraction of its overlay whenever an estate owner 
wishes to vary it or eliminate it.144 A lawyer must know the overlay, all of 
its subtleties, and how the estate owner’s true design differs from it. This 
is not an easy matter because the overlay’s requirements often seem 
counterintuitive. Further, one must know how to remove the overlay and 
prevent it from interfering with an otherwise clearly expressed dispositive 
design. Once again, this is not an easy matter because the statutory 
mechanisms for aborting the requirements of § 2-707 are replete with 
surprises. In short, language that clearly articulates a different result will 
not necessarily yield such result. 
 142. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. This suggests a third underlying assumption 
for § 2-707: trust provisions that do not include these conditions of survivorship and substitute gifts to 
living descendants of deceased beneficiaries are drafted by inexperienced and often incompetent 
lawyers. 
 143. See supra Parts IV.B & C. 
 144. For discussion of these problems, see supra Part III.B. 
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Putting the foregoing costs aside, however, one must examine the 
benefits of § 2-707 and the questions and problems they raise and the 
special costs associated with them. One should first observe that § 2-707 is 
grounded upon presumed intent and that estate owner intent has always 
been the main mantra of courts when deciding problems of interpretation, 
and such intent has frequently underscored the results courts reach in these 
cases.145 Sophisticated commentators and judges, however, sometimes 
recognize that such intent is often nonexistent because the problem under 
consideration was undoubtedly never anticipated and, therefore, never 
contemplated by the estate owner. Consequently, they recognize that 
“actual dispositive intent” under these circumstances is merely a fiction. 
And what courts are really doing when they purport to apply intent is 
fabricating a solution based upon what judges believe the estate owner 
would have really wanted if he had been asked the right questions and then 
responded with an appropriate choice.146  
Construction through fabricated intent is commonplace in the law of 
future interests, but perhaps the best example is the rule of convenience 
which judges use to determine the maximum membership of class gifts.147 
Most often, language that creates a class gift fails clearly to specify 
maximum limits to the class. Usually limits are implied. For example, an 
immediate devise from A “to the children of B” is assumed to include all 
the children B may have. Because it is a class gift, one also assumes that 
B’s children are entitled to equal shares. Finally, one assumes that B’s 
children are intended to receive distribution of their respective shares 
immediately upon creation, namely, at the settlement of A’s estate. 
Sometimes one or more of these assumed directions is made explicit.148 
 145. See SIMES & SMITH, supra note 20, § 465. 
 146. Id.; see also Roberts v. Tamworth, 73 A.2d 119, 121 (N.H. 1950). 
It is frequently said in will cases that the testatrix’ intention is the sovereign guide in the 
interpretation of a will. No one disputes the truth of this beguiling and sonorous statement but 
candor compels the admission that it is of doubtful utility in determining intent where there 
may be none. ‘In many cases the court is ascertaining not what the [testator] actually intended 
in regard to a particular matter but what he would have intended if he had thought about the 
matter . . . .’ If the testatrix did not think about the matter, it is difficult to say that she had an 
intent with respect to it. In that case the court is looking for a black hat in a dark room; if the 
court locates it there at all, it will be on its own head and not because of any light left by the 
last will and testament. . . . If courts can fairly and reasonably ascertain the decedent’s desire 
from the will, intellectual honesty requires that they say so without resorting to a fiction of 
intent where none existed. 
Id. (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). 
 147. For a full discussion of the rules that govern determination of the maximum membership of 
class gifts, see SIMES & SMITH, supra note 20, §§ 631–51.  
 148. See, for example, Thomas v. Thomas, 51 S.W. 111, (Mo. 1899), one of the leading cases on 
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Problems arise, however, whenever potential members are born after the 
time for first distribution of principal. In this example, the problem would 
arise if B were to survive A and thereafter had an additional child or 
children. These children would then have been born after the time for first 
distribution if B had had any children alive at A’s death. 
The problem exists because of a perceived conflict among the 
foregoing three directions. Courts could, of course, accommodate all three 
directions with reallocations of distributed principal in the event others 
were born and, therefore, members were added after first distribution of 
principal. This would necessitate ongoing court surveillance and 
supervision because class members who had received their respective 
shares would be required to return portions of it each time the class 
expanded. Courts, however, regard this as administratively inconvenient 
and, therefore, a burden they are unwilling to assume. Because this is not 
viewed as a viable choice, courts conclude that all three directions cannot 
be implemented “as is,” even if all three were made explicit. Ultimately 
courts have settled upon a compromise that they believe correlates with 
the probable intent of estate owners, namely, that the class must close and 
the maximum membership fixed at the time of first distribution of 
principal. Many courts justify this result on the basis of actual intent.149 In 
reality, it is a fabricated intent. It is the court’s own answer to the question 
of what do they believe the estate owner would have intended if she had 
been presented with the problem and its available solutions. 
This approach seems remarkably similar to the one underlying § 2-707. 
Both the court-created solution to issues of class composition and 
§ 2-707’s creation of conditions and substitute gifts are predicated upon 
fabricated intent; once again, what the estate owner would really have 
wanted if she had addressed the problem directly. Nevertheless, there is an 
important distinction between the approaches of courts in construction 
cases generally and § 2-707, one that forces us to assess the benefits of 
each approach differently. Principles of construction and interpretation 
adopted by courts that reflect fabricated estate owner intent are invariably 
triggered by perceived ambiguity derived from incomplete or inadequate 
expression. For example, the rule of convenience will not control class 
composition whenever the language is complete, unambiguous, and does 
the subject of maximum class membership and the rule of convenience. In that case, the testator 
expressly directed that all children born to his son should be included within the class, that payment of 
his or her share should be made to each child upon arriving at majority, and that division among the 
group should be in equal shares. Id. at 111. 
 149. See, e.g., id. at 113–14. 
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not present an administratively inconvenient solution.150 Courts apply this 
rule only when the language itself does not offer an acceptable basis for 
determination. The rule does not change the basic paradigm for creation. It 
is decisive whenever something—invariably, something contradictory or 
ambiguous—has gone wrong in the conversion of estate owner intent into 
command language. Indeed, it does govern on the basis of what most 
people would prefer under the circumstances. It will not, however, govern 
at all if the language is clear and not problematic. It is not designed to 
rewrite provisions that offer unambiguous and viable results even when 
courts firmly believe that the estate owner might have intended and, 
therefore, should have provided otherwise. To be sure, many of these 
decisions are explained in terms of estate owner intent. Just as often, 
however, a court might say that “it’s not what we believe the estate owner 
intended but what the language clearly says.”151 Quite differently, 
§ 2-707’s fabricated intent controls even when no ambiguity exists under 
the basic common law paradigm used for the creation and interpretation of 
interests. The rule of convenience differs greatly from § 2-707; indeed, the 
rule of convenience does not present an interpretive license to improve an 
estate plan through fabricated intent. 
Additionally, one should observe that § 2-707’s fabricated intent 
assumes the existence of a universal intent for all estate owners. It also 
assumes that unambiguous dispositive manifestations of a different 
intent—that is, the failure to express conditions of survivorship along with 
substitute gifts—reflect inexperienced or inadequate lawyering. These 
assumptions are downright dangerous because many of § 2-707’s 
assumptions are counterintuitive and open to serious question, especially 
 150. For example, consider these two trusts that leave principal to the children of C: (1) “Income 
to B for life, and then to all of C’s children equally absolutely and forever. However, if C survives B, 
distribution of principal shall be deferred until the death of C. Until then, income shall be distributed 
equally among C’s children”; (2) “Income to B for life, and then to all of C’s children absolutely and 
forever, with distribution to be made equally among C’s children born by the time of B’s death. 
However, if C survives B, the trustee is directed to reserve a portion of the principal to be held for the 
benefit of any children C may have after the death of B. If none are born thereafter, such reserved 
portion of principal shall be added to the shares of children who previously received distributions of 
principal.” Both examples avoid the administrative dilemma underlying the rule of convenience. In the 
first example, principal is left to all of C’s children equally, but the administrative dilemma is avoided 
by deferring distribution until C’s death when she can no longer have additional children. In the 
second example, distribution is not deferred. Instead, a portion of the principal is set aside for those 
who are born after the death of B. Although courts are unwilling to supervise recovery of portions of 
shares already distributed to beneficiaries, they have no problem with a trust that defers and staggers 
payment of portions of the principal. 
 151. See, e.g., MANDEL, THE PREPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS 8 (1955); PIESSE, 
THE ELEMENTS OF DRAFTING 11–12 (J.K. Aitken ed., 5th ed. 1976). 
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those that control alternative gifts.152 Further, although some of § 2-707’s 
underlying assumptions may predominate among estate owners, without 
more, no one can assume universality for all of the estate planning norms 
that underscore it. Yet rather than relying on lawyers to do the right thing, 
the proponents of § 2-707 intrude and rewrite documents without really 
knowing in each case whether § 2-707’s revised product comports with an 
estate owner’s actual intent. The risks are enormous. Inexperienced and 
experienced lawyers alike can prepare documents that unwittingly misfire 
because the complex nuances of the statutory overlay imposed by § 2-707 
may be misunderstood. Further, escape from the statute can become 
unduly difficult and, therefore, never mastered. And because of this, there 
will be instances in which carefully conceived and intelligent plans are 
subverted. The shift in paradigm caused by § 2-707 will not be without 
significant costs. In short, the benefits achieved through § 2-707’s overlay 
are at best questionable, and they are not without potential for 
overwhelming costs. 
Beyond these costs and concerns as to § 2-707’s fabricated intent, there 
seems to be something fundamentally wrong with the way in which the 
proponents of § 2-707 achieve its benefits. Surely one ought to wonder 
about the matter of arrogance. The subjects of § 2-707 are future interests 
created by trusts, testamentary or living trusts. Future interests, however, 
created without a trust—for example by deed—are excepted. Unlike the 
preparation of deeds, lawyers almost always have a hand in the creation of 
trusts. Given this reality, underscoring § 2-707 is a premise that some 
lawyers know better what the clients of others actually want and that these 
select lawyers should be able to dictate to all through intervention into 
lawyer-client relationships and their work products. Sometimes this 
intervention will yield a good result, but sometimes it will not. One never 
knows for certain. Surely, there is something fundamentally wrong with 
 152. Counterintuitive provisions within § 2-707 include its provisions for an ultimate gift to heirs: 
for example, its provision that governs nontestamentary trusts and creates statutory substitute gifts to 
heirs even though heirs are not included elsewhere within the estate owner’s trust or will. For further 
discussion, see Becker, supra note 14, at 359. Also, § 2-707 is counterintuitive with respect to 
alternative gifts. To begin with, a giftover to the residue within a non-residuary devise itself, one that 
explicitly controls in the event the beneficiary of the future interest does not survive the time for 
distribution, does not qualify as an alternative future interest that would otherwise eliminate the 
statutory substitute gift to living descendants of the deceased beneficiary. For further discussion, see 
id. at 358, 391–92. Additionally, if an alternative future interest is created as a substitute in the event 
there are no survivors with respect to a future interest in a class expressly subject to a requirement of 
survivorship of the time for distribution, the statutory substitute gift to living descendants of deceased 
class members is not completely eliminated. There are scenarios in which these descendants are 
included and others in which they are excluded, which taken together, do not make sense in terms of 
any consistent intent one might impute to an estate owner. For further discussion, see id. at 393–95. 
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law reform that embarks on a mission of “we know better than you,” even 
though the reformers are without benefit of individual client contact. To be 
sure, the real world of law practice is replete with dispositive designs that 
have gone awry, often because of problems that should have been 
anticipated and resolved. If the lawyers responsible for these documents 
had engaged in comprehensive prevision and expert provision, these 
problems would not have arisen.153 But that’s the real world. The solution 
to estate designs that misfire and misdirect should not be forced 
intervention and revision accomplished through statutory overlays. One 
instance—such as § 2-707—will lead to another and another and another 
instance of one group of “expert lawyers” interfering with what all others 
do. Where will it end? Surely, there are more appealing solutions. Better 
education, within and without law school, and a heightened sense of 
professional responsibility and knowledge as to what it takes to prepare 
effective dispositive instruments is a much better way to proceed. Section 
2-707 is more than an act of arrogance; it’s the wrong way to assure better 
dispositive plans and instruments. Above all, such need for improved 
estate planning does not justify serious changes to the common law 
paradigm and the long-term costs they will inflict. Better estate plans 
should never be achieved at the expense of the systems of command 
expression that are always needed to carry out such designs. 
To summarize, § 2-707 rewrites existing trusts that deviate from the 
mainstream of estate planning. Section 2-707 is designed to produce better 
results, at least those most estate owners would desire if asked the right 
questions and offered the right choices. Its benefits derive from the results 
it achieves: it saves death costs, directs principal to those really intended to 
benefit, and spares inexperienced lawyers from malpractice claims. In 
accomplishing this, § 2-707 fabricates a universal intent for estate owners. 
However, unlike other rules governing the interpretation of property 
interests that proceed from fabricated intent, § 2-707 imposes its 
dispositive overlay despite the presence of language with clear and 
unmistakable meaning. It is not triggered by problematic language but 
instead by a simple language format that would otherwise be viewed as 
unambiguous. At best, then, these benefits rest upon a fabrication that 
 153. See supra note 90. For a thorough discussion of construction problems and their underlying 
issues of prevision and provision and for further illustration of what lawyers must do to accomplish 
“comprehensive and astute prevision” and “concise and accurate provision,” see David M. Becker, 
Broad Perspective in the Development of a Flexible Estate Plan, 63 IOWA L. REV. 751 (1978); David 
M. Becker, Future Interests and the Myth of the Simple Will: An Approach to Estate Planning (Pts. 1 
& 2), 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 607 (1973), 1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1974). 
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radically departs from interventions of the past. Further, § 2-707’s 
fabricated intent is flawed. At the very least, it can never reflect universal 
wishes among estate owners, especially because some of its overlay is 
counterintuitive and because estate owners inevitably offer countless 
differences among their wants and dispositive desires. To be sure, 
§ 2-707’s overlay can be modified or revoked, but the risks of 
misinterpretation and misdirection are great for both inexperienced and 
experienced lawyers. Consequently, the stakes are high and so are the 
potential costs of § 2-707. In the end, § 2-707 reflects an arrogant attempt 
to rewrite trusts because its proponents know best what the clients of 
others always want. These then are the short term costs of § 2-707. The 
long term costs lie in a new paradigm that ratchets up significantly the 
complexities and difficulties of expressing command thoughts for the 
creation of interests. 
V. CONCLUSION  
Once again, the common law paradigm for creation and interpretation 
of interests begins with the assumption that silence equals nothing; that is, 
silence translates into nothing more by way of additional interests and 
conditions. The formation of a disposition begins with a blank slate. 
Nothing is transferred until and if expressed. Consequently, the entire 
conveyance is shaped cumulatively through the explication and addition of 
component interests. Section 2-707 was intended to produce better trusts 
that reflect the answers that most estate owners would give if asked the 
right questions respecting dispositive design. Nevertheless, it 
accomplishes this by assaulting the common law system for command 
expression.154 Consequently, silence now equals something some of the 
time and nothing most of the time. The paradigm has been converted into 
a mixed bag in which the transfer of ownership still requires addition, but 
often it requires careful and sophisticated subtraction of portions or all of 
the silent overlay imposed by § 2-707. As a result, one is left with a new 
system that is exceedingly complicated and makes the overall task of 
drafting much more problematic. 
These difficulties should not be surprising. One should observe that the 
common law system is not the only paradigm grounded upon a blank slate, 
 154. Once again, this refers to command expressions that are intended to control the distribution 
and disposition of property interests governed by recognized instruments of transfer. There are, of 
course, other forms of command expressions within the law generally and also within the law of 
property. These would, for example, include those commands imposed by statute. 
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with silence amounting to nothing and with directions imposed by 
addition. These paradigms all work because of their clarity and their 
simplicity in formulating both elementary and complex commands. The 
composition of music is perhaps the best analogy because it rests upon a 
formal paradigm much the same as the creation of trusts is tied to the 
common law paradigm. A composer begins with a blank slate. Nothing 
exists by way of directive sound until the first note is put to paper. 
Thereafter, absent an indication for improvisation,155 nothing is to be 
played and heard except for the musical notes that have been expressed. 
Additionally, the direction is cumulative. The musical piece is expressed 
by addition and not subtraction. One note after another and another add up 
to the final composition. Some short-hand notations may exist such as 
keys, flats, and sharps. But these notations do not alter the character of the 
paradigm; specifically, nothing exists until and unless it is expressed 
through positive notation.156 
Consider another analogy that involves an informal paradigm for 
command expression. Shopping lists can be composed for one’s own 
guidance, but they can also be composed as specific directions for others 
that must be observed in making retail purchases. Indeed, the directions 
can be as concrete as the directions an estate owner gives to a trustee 
concerning the delineation of beneficiaries and the terms of each gift. How 
then does one create a shopping list? Each item is spelled out one by one. 
The list is expanded by addition and the cumulation of all the items taken 
together constitutes the full shopping list.157 Sometimes alternatives are 
included. Items may be subtracted and others may replace them, 
depending perhaps on the price per unit and the number of units that are 
 155. Sometimes a composition will expressly allow for improvisation. This is, unto itself, as much 
of a positive direction from the composer as is the inscription of a specific series of musical notes. 
Sometimes, however, a performer will elect to improvise even when the composer offers no specific 
direction to do so. This is much the essence of jazz. When this kind of improvisation occurs, the 
ultimate product that is heard is not strictly the musical command of the composer, but instead, it 
reflects the unique imprint of the performer as well.  
 156. The final product may, of course, contain repeat phrases and passages, but even this must be 
noted in some manner. The composition may also contain rest notes that are added to the blank slate in 
order to impose silence in the midst of sound. 
 157. A shopping list may, of course, contain short-hand directions often used among members of a 
family. For example, it may say: “Buy items b, c, d, e, and f, along with the usual.” The “usual” is a 
short-hand representation for repeated lists or portions of lists from the past, and it may be expressed 
or always implied. Either way, the usual is of itself just as much a positive direction as is the 
designation of “b, c, d, e, and f.” The instruction may also introduce items eliminated from the “usual,” 
and thus present a need for subtraction. Nevertheless, this subtraction is from a list created by positive 
direction and not from one imposed automatically by statute. 
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available. Again, this is very similar to the express use of conditions and 
the inclusion of substitute gifts in the creation of trusts.158 
Just imagine, however, formulating a shopping list for a trip to Wal-
Mart that reflects a paradigm predicated exclusively upon negation rather 
than positive affirmation. Just imagine a system for command expression 
in which silence would mean that every item within the store were to be 
purchased. Negation would, however, be permitted, and one could 
accomplish this by specifying items not to be purchased on a list—a 
reverse shopping list that would spell out each item to be rejected. Just 
think how difficult and inefficient this would be to formulate even if one 
had access to the full inventory of the store and could replicate it ahead of 
time. Or imagine a paradigm that presented a mixed bag of affirmation and 
negation, one similar to the effect § 2-707 has had on the creation of trusts 
and their beneficial interests. Imagine a system in which shopping lists 
were created for a trip to Wal-Mart that required positive expression of all 
items to be purchased with the exception of shoes, men’s shirts, 
vegetables, and sundries. As to these latter categories, silence meant that 
everything was to be purchased, for example, all vegetables and all 
sundries. If this were not intended, then one had to specify items that were 
not to be purchased. In the end, the shopping list would enumerate items 
that were to be purchased along with specific sundries, vegetables, shoes, 
and shirts that were not to be purchased. Imagine the confusion, problems, 
and likelihood for error generated by this mixed-bag paradigm. 
Undoubtedly, it would appeal to no one, and everyone would be wary of 
 158. One should also observe that there are many forms of nonverbal communication that parallel 
the common law paradigm and its blank slate. Consider the use of signs in baseball that coaches and 
managers give to players. The default is generally free choice for the batter and sometimes for a base 
runner as well. Signs are given to execute certain things. Those signs may require renewal for each 
pitch or conceivably for each time at bat. Sometimes a sign may subtract a previous instruction, 
thereby bringing the batter back to free choice or some other existing instruction. And sometimes the 
signs themselves may amount to nothing because, through a previous instruction, they are intended to 
mask the actual direction. Nevertheless, each instruction proceeds from the blank slate or default and 
builds to a final communication on which the player must act. 
 In another striking example of command thought structure, the Danish toy company Lego uses a 
similar paradigm in its instructions to construct its toys from small pieces of interconnecting plastic. 
With the complete absence of language, Lego instructions begin with the blank slate and step-by-step 
add pieces to this blank slate, slowly but surely creating the end result. Construction is accomplished 
by addition and silence is meaningless. Each instruction is made up of a simple picture of the desired 
structure, which usually contains several more pieces added in various locations, beginning with the 
first instruction which is several pieces standing alone, added to the blank slate which is the basis. 
These instructions continue piece by piece until the desired product has been created—a nonverbal 
step-by-step process of addition only that uses the positive expression of command thought to reach its 
goals. Complete instructions for five different train-related objects can be found at 
http://www.lego.com/eng/trains/workshop/buildinstructions.asp (last visited June 11, 2005). 
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paradigm changes that made it the prevailing system for formulating 
shopping lists. 
Surely one should have the same concerns about § 2-707 and any other 
assaults upon the common law paradigm. Just imagine the complexities 
that would be caused by taking § 2-707 several steps further. For example, 
assume that § 2-707 converted its automatic substitute gift to living 
descendants of a deceased beneficiary into a gift in default of the exercise 
of a power of appointment and that it gave each beneficiary of a future 
interest who failed to survive the time for distribution a non-general 
testamentary power to appoint principal to such beneficiary’s living 
descendants. Further, assume § 2-707 automatically included staggered 
age requirements for distribution of principal to the beneficiary or to those 
living descendants who took pursuant to such power or gift in default. 
Each of these additions would be consistent with mainstream estate 
planning and viewed as good practice.159 Each of these changes would 
expand the statutory overlay and further alter the meaning of silence. 
Under this expanded version of § 2-707, its overlay would control even if 
unintended so long as the overlay were not expressly negated in the 
manner permitted by the statute. Just imagine how this would compound 
the problems of creating and interpreting trusts that utilize future interests. 
Or consider another possible statutory substitute for silence, namely, a 
perpetuities saving clause. This additional overlay would reflect what all 
experienced estate planners include in trusts that involve future 
interests.160 One would imagine such an overlay to be quite popular. After 
all, everyone should favor protective devices that secure estate designs 
against unintended and unexpected disasters that might otherwise sabotage 
the entire plan. Perpetuities saving clauses do exactly that, and that is why 
lawyers use them. Yet silence under the common law paradigm has meant 
nothing thus far as to these saving clauses. Until expressed, the clause 
does not exist. Perpetuities reform has occurred with great profusion, but it 
has not accomplished this by changing the common law paradigm for 
creation of interests.161 And this is probably for very good reasons, 
 159. See supra notes 127–28. One should observe, however, that age requirements that are used 
with respect to “descendants” covered by the power or gift in default usually impose directions for 
payment and not requirements of survivorship. This occurs because of the perpetuities problems that 
can arise with respect to groups of recipients that are not confined to lives in being when the interests 
are created. 
 160. For a summary of various kinds of saving clauses, references to the form books in which they 
regularly appear, a discussion of their components and how these clauses function, and finally 
illustrations of their defects and inadequacies, see Becker, supra note 5, at 378–407. 
 161. Some of the perpetuities reforms are designed to patch up specific kinds of perpetuities 
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including the fact that one size—one kind of saving clause—can never fit 
all. Statutory overlays that change the meaning of silence by including a 
standardized saving clause are not worth the risks of misguided redirection 
of principal and the problems they generate for lawyers who must fashion 
estate plans that conform to individual wishes.162 
Perpetuities saving clauses are good things. And most of the time, so 
are conditions of survivorship and substitute gifts triggered by any failure 
to satisfy these conditions. But so are many other practices that 
experienced and sophisticated estate planners follow. Most likely, these 
are matters that all planners should raise with clients, and these are 
provisions that all lawyers should include whenever consistent with 
individual designs. But altering the meaning of silence and, therefore, the 
common law paradigm is not the way to achieve better lawyering and 
better work products. The fundamental problem lies with those who 
practice estate planning and not with the system for command expression. 
Consequently, the solution ought to address the former and not the 
latter.163 There is a saying that is especially relevant and familiar to all. “If 
it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” For this there may be an appropriate corollary: 
problems that have repeatedly yielded undesirable results. However, the most significant changes have 
been much more pervasive and substantial. Generally, they either convert the rule into an actualities 
test or offer courts discretionary powers of reformation of the problematic provision in the event of a 
perpetuities violation. Most, however, do both. See supra note 4; see also Becker, supra note 5, at 
356–65. One should carefully note that the redirection of subject matter whenever a violation occurs is 
not at all like the intrusion into silence that is imposed by § 2-707. To begin with, a court’s power to 
reform, and therefore alter the estate design, does not arise unless and until a provision violates the rule 
against perpetuities and, therefore, becomes unenforceable as written. Consequently, a court cannot 
intrude unless the language itself causes a void in the dispositive scheme. Additionally, the powers 
given to courts are discretionary. There is no preordained solution or dispositive design imposed upon 
all estates that present perpetuities problems. The solution is discretionary and flexible and it must be 
adapted to the identifiable wishes of the estate owner. This is unlike § 2-707 and also unlike saving 
clauses which frequently redirect principal to then living income beneficiaries. See supra note 159. 
Nevertheless, one should observe that the latter redirection still reflects the estate owner’s explicit 
choice. Section 2-707, however, does not. 
 162. For discussion and illustration of why tailor-made provision-by-provision perpetuities 
compliance is superior to “the one size fits all” approach of a standard saving clause, see Becker, supra 
note 5, at 408–16. 
 163. For example, education during and after law school should be the focus of any lasting 
solution. Law schools, in particular, have not done a very good job in preparing students for the 
practice of estate planning. To begin with, there are not many courses that touch upon estate planning 
in most law school curricula. Indeed, there are not many courses devoted to the skills needed for 
planning generally as opposed to litigating. More importantly, perhaps, many students graduate 
without full appreciation of the specialized information and skills needed to plan and implement the 
disposition of estates. Quite the contrary, many schools popularize the notion that the one thing every 
student should be able to do upon graduation is to prepare a simple will or trust. As a result, lawyers of 
every stripe and experience prepare these documents and, as a result, many fail to ask the right 
questions, design the appropriate plan, and include effective conditions and provisions. 
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“If you do attempt to fix it, you may break it.” And over time this kind of 
law reform may prove to be terribly unwise. 
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